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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
February 21, 1986 Conference
List 7, Sheet 3

)

No. 85-1129
JOHNSON (excluded white male)

v.
SANTA CLARA COUNTY
TRANSPORTATION AGENCY1 £!3.1 IlL·
1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Fed./Civ.

Petr argues that the CA9 erred in holding that

a public employer
plan to correct female-male imbalances

relevant workforce

in the absence of past discrimination.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Petr was a long-term

employee of resp Transportation Agen

employer.

He

and several others

establish their

minimal competency for a promotion to a certain position in a
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category called skilled craft workers.

Five of them scored

higher than 70, the threshold qualifying score.

Petr received

the second highest score of 75, and a female competitor, Diane
Joyce, a less senior employee, ranked fourth with a score of

72.5, rounded up to 73.

The five minimally qualified applicants

were then tested orally by a committee.

The committee

unanimously recommended to the Agency Director that petr be
selected for the promotion.

Neither party denied that the

examination process was fair and gender neutral.
Meanwhile, Joyce informed the County Affirmative Action
Coordinator that she had ranked fourth among the five qualifiers
on the written examination.

The Coordinator recommended to the

Agency Director that Joyce be selected for the promotion pursuant
to the Agency's voluntary affirmative action plan.

The Director

followed the Coordinator's recommendation and promoted Joyce.
Petr then brought a suit against resp, alleging that because
he was more qualified than Joyce on an objective basis, the
promotion of Joyce instead of him constituted unlawful sex
discrimination under Title VII.

The District Court found that

petr was more qualified than Joyce and that, but for his sex, he
would have been promoted to the position and that, but for her
sex, Joyce would not have been so promoted.

The court rejected

resp's defense that its actions were just(fied as an
implementation of its voluntary affirmative action plan.

The

court concluded that resp had failed to prove that its plan was
"bona fide" under the standards enunciated in United Steelworkers
of America v. Weber, 443

u.s.

193 (1979), because it failed to

- 3 show that the plan was temporary and remedial.

A permanent and

nonremedial plan unnecessarily trammels the interests of other
employees like petr.

The District Court therefore ordered resp

to promote and award petr back pay, and it enjoined resp from
engaging in further discrimination against him.
A divided CA9 reversed.

The majority observed that United

Steelworkers of America v. Weber, supra, "held that Title VII
does not forbid private employers and unions from agreeing to the
voluntary adoption of a bona fide affirmative action plan aimed
at eliminating racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories."

App. 2la.

Under CA9 precedent, that holding has

been extended to public employers and gender discrimination.
LaRiviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (CA9 1982)

(Wallace, J.).

See
The

majority then determined that "[a] careful examination of the
record in this case and of the opinion below persuades us that
the district court adopted an overly restrictive view of Weber."
App. 23a.

In the majority's view, resp's affirmative action plan

satisfied Weber's requirement that it be temporary and remedial,
and that it not create a permanent bar to the advancement or
unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-minority (white male)
employees.
The majority concluded that resp's plan is sufficiently
temporary because it creates flexible percentage "goals" for
attaining a female-male balance rather than rigid "quotas" for
maintaining such a balance, and it does not expressly assert that
it is permanent.

App. 23a-26a.

The Agency Director's testimony

that the affirmative action plan "is a permanent part of the

- 4 agency's basic operating philosophy" should be understood as
expressing no more than a long-range commitment to attaining the
balance.

App. 24a.

"Implicit in the plan is the intent to stop

taking sex into account once the long-range percentage goals are
attained."

App. 25a.

The majority also concluded that the plan is remedial
because statistics showed a conspicuous imbalance between the
percentage of women in the general population and the percentage
in resp's workforce.

(Of resp's 238 skilled craft workers at the

time the plan was adopted, not one of them was a woman.)

To

satisfy the remediality requirement of a voluntary affirmative
action plan, public officials need only produce evidence of a
conspicuous imbalance, and not evidence that purposeful
discrimination on the part of themselves or their predecessors
caused the imbalance.

"A plethora of proof is hardly necessary

to show that women are generally underrepresented in [skilled
craft] positions and that strong social pressures weigh against
their participation."

App. 27a.

Finally, the majority concluded that the plan does not
create an absolute bar to the advancement opportunities or
trammel the interests of non-minority employees.

The majority

explained that" [t]he plan does not indicate ••• that other
employees will be barred or that their interests will be
unnecessarily infringed."

App. 28a.

Instead, "the plan

contemplates the expansion of opportunity for all."

Ibid.

This

is likely to occur because at the time the plan was adopted, resp
had plans to expand its bus fleet, thereby creating more jobs for

-

all.

5 -

Moreover, it is unreasonable to infer an absolute bar or

unnecessary burden absent a pattern of exclusions of white male
candidates.

The fact that Joyce's sex was the decisive factor in

this case does not mean that white males will always be excluded
in the future.

Affirmative action is necessary and lawful

because the mere existence of "opportunity" for females will not
assure the prompt attainment of sexual parity in the workforce.
Judge Wallace concurred in part and dissented in part.

He

agreed that the DC should be reversed because he could not
determine whether the DC had properly allocated the burdens of
proof and because it had not made sufficiently detailed findings
to hold that the plan was invalid under the Weber factors.

But

he believed that the record was equally insufficient to reach the
opposite conclusion that the plan was valid as the majority did,
and would have remanded for further consideration.
In Judge Wallace's view, a Title VII plaintiff's only burden
of persuasion is to make out a prima facie case of discrimination
in an employment decision.

The burden then shifts to the

employer to show a legal justification for its action.

The

ordinary way to accomplish this is to rebut the evidence of
discrimination by establishing a non-discriminatory reason for
the decision.

The establishment of an affirmative defense should

also accomplish this objective.

One such defense is that a

particular act of discrimination was done pursuant to a bona fide
affirmative action plan.

The employer would carry the burden of

proving that any plan asserted as a defense satisfies the
requirements of Weber.

Judge Wallace criticized the majority for

-

6 -

concluding without analysis that an employer need only show "some
evidence" that a plan is reasonably related to the goal of
remedying a female-male imbalance, and then the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to prove that the plan is invalid.

He nevertheless

concluded that the DC's judgment should be vacated and the case
remanded since the record does not indicate how the DC allocated
the burdens of proof.
Judge Wallace also contended that there were insufficient
findings in the record to support either the DC's conclusion that
the plan was invalid or the majority's conclusion that it was
valid.

He first set forth Weber's four criteria for a valid

plan, which are whether it (1) is remedial by being aimed at
correcting "manifest racial imbalances in traditionally
segregated job categories,"

(2) avoids unnecessarily trammeling

the interests of other employees,

(3) avoids being an absolute

bar to the advancement of other employees, and

(4) is temporary.

He reasoned that there was insufficient evidence to establish
whether the plan was remedial.

He agreed with Janowiak v. City

of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557, 562 (CA7 1984)

(cert. pending), that

to be remedial a voluntary plan must not simply be aimed at
correcting a "manifest imbalance" between the sexes, but be
reasonably related to correcting such an imbalance in a
"traditionally segregated job categor[y]" -- that is, where the
imbalance was caused by past discrimination.

Although a judicial

determination of past discrimination is unnecessary, an "employer
must be able to point to past or present discriminatory patterns
or practices that created the traditional segregation of the job

- 7 categories in question," app. 42a, in order to meet his burden of
proving that the plan was bona fide.

While statistics may be

helpful in showing a correlation that implies purposeful
discrimination, "an employer cannot rely on statistics alone as a
short-cut around the critical need for causal evaluation and
analysis."

App. 43a (emphasis added).

Judge Wallace also argued that the majority's conclusion
that the plan did not improperly infringe upon the interests of
other employees or create an absolute bar to their advancement
had no basis whatsoever in the record and was only weakly
supported in the abstract.

He also criticized the majority's

argument that all affirmative action plans are sufficiently
temporary so long as they do not expressly admit permanence.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues that the CA9's decision is

based on an incorrect interpretation of Weber, and conflicts with
Janowiak, because it holds that a mere statistical imbalance in
the workforce, as opposed to a showing of past discrimination, is
sufficient justification for an affirmative action plan.
Resp contends that Janowiak is distinguishable on the ground
that it involved the value of statistics at the summary judgment
stage, in a case in which conflicting evidence made summary
judgment inappropriate.

In contrast, the CA9 carefully reviewed

the trial record and concluded that the st~tistics established
the plan's remedial purpose.

Moreover, the CA7 has subsequently

stated that "Janowiak does not purport to require a finding of
past discrimination for an affirmative action plan in a
traditionally segregated job category to survive a Title VII

- 8 challenge," Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 775
F.2d 794, 805, n. 13 (CA7 1985), explaining that "presumably the
employer is itself competent to make a finding of past
discrimination."
4.
context.

Id., at 803, n. 12.

DISCUSSION:

The language of Britton is taken out of

The thrust of note 12 is that although Janowiak holds

that a "competent body" must make a finding of past
discrimination before a public employer can engage in affirmative
action, the holding does not apply to private employers who are
competent to make the finding themselves.

The meaning of note 13

is that when a disparity is found in a "traditionally segregated
job category" that means that the disparity is the result of past
discrimination.

Therefore, the conflict has not been wiped out.

The Court may wish to take the case to resolve the conflict over
how to interpret the ambiguous language of Weber.
On the other hand, the decisions in the other affirmative
action cases may shed light on this issue making review at this
time unnecessary.

For that possibility, I recommend holding this

----

case, like Janowiak, No. 84-1936 (cert. pending), for Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, No. 84-1340, Local 28 of the Sheet
Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC, No. 84-1656,
and Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland, No. 84-1999.
There is a response.
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Held for No. 84-1656, ' Local 28 v. EEOC; and No. 84-1999,
Local 93 v. City of Cleveland
o. 85-112 , Johnson v. Transportation Agency, No. 85-1129

f-or
Petitioner has been mployed by respondent Santa Clara
County Transportation Ag cy since 1967. In 1979, when
~ ~$
8
respondent announced an pening for a road dispatcher, Johnson
and eight others applied the position. Johnson, with a score of
75, tied for second on an examination given by a two-member oral
board; Diane Joyce, the only female applicant, placed fourth with
a score of 72.5. Like Johnson, Joyce was a long-time agency
employee with relevant work experience. Agency employees
conducted a second, departmental oral board for applicants who
had passed the first examination, and unanimously recommeded
Johnson for the dispatcher position. Joyce ranked third after
the interview; however, the Agency Director appointed Joyce to
the dispatcher position pursuant to the Agency's voluntary, noncollectively bargained affirmative action plan. The plan
established a long-range goal for the Agency to attain a work
force whose composition in all major job classifications
approximated the distribution of women, minorities, and
handicapped persons in the County labor force. The plan stated
that women had traditionally been underrepresetned in the
relevant job classifications and recognized an extreme difficulty
in increasing the representation of women in skill-craft
positions. At the time the plan was implemented, none of the
Agency's 238 skill-craft positions was held by a woman.
Johnson challenged that Agency's failure to promote him to
the road dispatcher position, in favor of a less qualified woman,
solely as a violation of Title VII. The District Court found
that Johnson would have been promoted but for his sex, and
concluded that the Agency's refusal to promote him violated Title
VII. The court rejected the agency's contention that its actions
had been taken pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan,
since, in the court's view, the Agency's plan was permanent and
designed to maintain a particular balance in the work force. The
court also suggested that the plan did not have a valid remedial
purpose, since the Agency had not shown that it had discriminated
against women in the past.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Applying ~ ndards we
announced in United Steelworkers of America v ~ 443 u.s. 93

~vrc--.~ w~-

1

~ OJ\k ~~.,..:,~

(1979), the court found that the Agency's affirmative action plan
did not violate Title VII. First, the court found the
affirmative action plan to be a temporary measure, designed to
eliminate male-female imbalance, rather than to maintain malefemale balance in the Agency's work force, and that the
preferential treatment of women would end once parity was
achieved. Second, the court found that the plan was part of a
remedial effort to break down entrenched patterns of
discrimination; the court pointed primarily to extensive
statistics contained in the plan illustrating the
underrepresentation of women, minorities, and the handicapped in
various Agency job categories. Third, the Court of Appeals
determined that the Plan did not unnecessarily trammel upon the
interests of other employees. While noting that Joyce's
promotion had "barred" Johnson's selection for the dispatcher
position, the court refused to conclude, absent some showing of a
pattern of exclusion of nonminorities from such positions, that a
single employment decision created a bar to the advancement of
nonminority workers. Rather, under the Agency's plan, sex was
viewed as an additional positive factor in an otherwise qualified
candidate.
This case does not directly implicate the issues decided in
either Local 28 or Local 93. In his petition for certiorari,
Johnson argues that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the
provisions of the Agency's affirmative action plan in concluding
that it was a temporary measure, and erred in holding that the ·
plan had a valid remedial purpose, since the Agency had made no
showing of past discrimination. Johnson's first issue is not
certworthy, since it involves only the proper interpretation of
the affirmative action plan challenged in this case. The second
issue is without merit; although the Agency did not show
it
had ~iscriminated against women, there was
substantial evidence of the plan's remedial purpose, most notably
the dramatic underrepresentation of women in Agency skill-craft
positions. The Cour of Appeals evaluated the legality of the
plan consistent
factors we announced in Weber. I shall
therefore vote

(1979), the court found that the Agency's affirmative action plan
did not violate Title VII. First, the court found the
affirmative action plan to be a temporary measure, designed to
eliminate male-female imbalance, rather than to maintain malefemale balance in the Agency's work force, and that the
preferential treatment of women would end once parity was
achieved. Second, the court found that the plan was part of a
remedial effort to break down entrenched patterns of
discrimination; the court pointed primarily to extensive
statistics contained in the plan illustrating the
underrepresentation of women, minorities, and the handicapped in
various Agency job categories. Third, the Court of Appeals
determined that the Plan did not unnecessarily trammel upon the
interests of other employees. While noting that Joyce's
promotion had "barred" Johnson's selection for the dispatcher
position, the court refused to conclude, absent some showing of a
pattern of exclusion of nonminorities from such positions, that a
single employment decision created a bar to the advancement of
nonminority workers. Rather, under the Agency's plan, sex was
viewed as an additional positive factor in an otherwise qualified
candidate.
This case does not directly implicate the issues decided in
either Local 28 or Local 93. In his petition for certiorari,
Johnson argues that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the
provisions of the Agency's affirmative action plan in concluding
that it was a temporary measure, and erred in holding that the ·
plan had a valid remedial purpose, since the Agency had made no
showing of past discrimination. Johnson's first issue is not
certworthy, since it involves only the proper interpretation of
the affirmative action plan challenged in this case. The second
issue is without merit; although the Agency did not show
it
had parposefUI y iscriminated against women, there was
substantial evidence of the plan's remedial purpose, most notably
the dramatic underrepresentation of women in Agency skill-craft
positions. The Cour of Appeals evaluated the legality of the
plan consistent
factors we announced in Weber. I shall
therefore vote

w 986

Court ................... .

"Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 .. .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No.

85-1129

JOHNSON
vs.

TRANSPORTATION AGENCY

Herefore held for 84-1656, Local 28 v. EEOC, etal.
Jackson.

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT
N

POST

DI S

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF

Also for Wygant v.

MOTION
G

ABSENT

NOT YOTING

D

I ~ .( . . . . . . . . . . .......... .
J.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .~ . . ............... .

Burger, Ch. J . ........ .. . . ....
Brennan,

White, J ....... .. ............ .

V.. j " .... ............ .

Marshall, J . ................. .

··· /

·············· ··

Blackmun, J ................. . ··· ··· · ····· ·1: · ·· ····· w~
Powell, J .................... .
.1.'.·...r.>:-......

/ .. (f.

Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Stevens, J . ................... ·; - .... .
O'Connor, J .......................... .

v

··1.~· ...........................
···············.
H~··········

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................... .

lsg 10/08/86

~ 1()/lf. f4.~~. ~ ~~'>'W\o'
J

-t!..e/

~ ~~ ~ JC/ttf . ~

~~ ~.v~~J.-u ~~

~hr~~~~
c::t.f

/L/-~d.~ ~i- C-~ .b..c-~
/9-A;?~~~

ur~f-

J.-o

~ · ~~

~ ~~J-tv8~~/~
----._,

, U/tt1~1 ~ ~4--1-r T~

tA.v

~~
~~~~-

BENCH MEMORANDUM

~~~~---~
~~~~
To:
From:

October 8, 1986

Justice Powell

~1~
VL.~~

Leslie
No. 85-1129

Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara, CA
Cert. to CA9

(Fletcher, Ferguson;

Wallace, cone. & diss.)

Wednesday, Nov. 12, 1986 (second argument)
I.

Summary

Petr in this case is a white male who claims that he
suffered unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII because
a less qualified female employee was preferred over him for
a promotion.

Resp claims that the preference was justified

by a lawful affirmative action plan which the employer voluntarily adopted to remedy persistent underrepresentation of
women in the employer's work force.

The question presented

page 2.

in this case is what limit Title VII imposes on a voluntary
affirmative action plan designed to remedy sex discr imination and applicable to promotions.
II.

Background

Resp is the Santa Clara County Transportation Agency
and

is an employer within the meaning of Title VII.

has been employed with the Agency since 1967.

e_

..-····-· - ----......._

years

he had worked

petr was a Road

as a

Main~enance

For eleven

....._

~1_:.;} .

--Yard

Petr

In 1979, when

Worker, the Agency announced an
A Road Dispatcher allocates

opening for a

crews, equipment, ~Inal:erials among the various road maintenance jobs in the County.

Petr had experience as a tempo-

rary Road Dispatcher for the Agency as well as with a private company before his

employment with the Agency.

and eight others applied for

the Road Dispatcher position.

t~
e
'red

Seven applicants achieved

II'\,;

on an examination given by a

Petr

score of 70 or above

- a-member oral board.

Petr

tied for second with a score o t : V Diane Joyce, the only
female

applicant,

score of 72.5,

placed

rounded

fourth
t@

on the examination with a
Joyce also was a long-time

Agency employee with considerable relevant
The applicants next went through
examination.

The examiners

1..

board

un ~~ ~ d

the Road Dispatcher position.

petr for

Meanwhile, Joyce informed the

County Women's Coordinator that she was ranked fourth on the
eligibility

list.

The

Women's

Coordinator

' {

informed

the

Agency's Affirmative Action Coordinator that Joyce had ap-

(~

?/

~ /l.L-~

page 3.

plied.

The Affirmative Action

the Agency Director

Coordinator

that Joyce

be

recommended

appointed.

to

The Agency

Director appointed Joyce to the position.
The Director appointed Joyce under the Agency's voluntary,

non-collectively bargained affirmative action plan

at issue in this litigation -- one established by the County
~

a

whole

and

the other

Transportation Agency,

established

which

is

the

specifically by
resp

in

this

the

action.

The goals and principles of the plans are similar, but primary

focus

is

on

the

~~~-~
a-rr-~~

Two affirmative action plans are ~ n~l-

dated December 18, 1978.

as

a~4f~

more

~

C:/J/.1 .

~~

"'-~~~.
/]~u_ ~~

-

~-~

specific Transportation Agency ~l--t..vu

ZL1~~

plan.

range goal to attain a work force whose composition in all

~?~

major job classifications, established by the Equal Employ-

~~

The Transportation Agency plan establishes a

ment Opportunity Commission,

approximates

long-

the distribution

r\,

~~
~~4-r.... .·

of women, minorities and handicapped persons in the County
labor market.

The plan notes that the long-term goal will

not be easy to obtain, due to a number of factors.
thus provides that the

ong-term

~1 ~ 11

--

-----:----=-

The plan

be attained in

successive stages, first in the Agency taken as a whole and
then

by

major

job

category.

The

plan

then

(1)
to

the personnel office and

where

there

affirmative
standard
,..--- ·-

for

is

provides

provide a guide

division directors

underreprsentation of minorities

action
use

is

required;

in determining

(2)
if

for

indicating
and

where

provide an objective
the

representation of

.5~ f-

page 4.

minorities in particular job classifications is at a reasonable level
persons

in comparison with estimates of the numbers of

from

these groups

in

the

area work

force who can
~

,{

meet the educational and experience requirem nts for employment;

and

permit adjustment of

(3)

Agen~ ing

goals as

may be necessary because of limitations on hiring or reducJ.A. at 61.

tions in the County work force.

The plan does not specify that the Agency engaged in
purposeful past discriminatory practices, although it bases
the need for the plan on its recognition "that mere prohibition of discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy
effects of past practices."

J.A. at 31.

P~ /..;::;;:v....;

u-1/

the ~~

Specifically, the

plan notes that "[e]xperience has shown that the selection

)4-v-r:....~~

~

and appointment processes are areas where hidden discrimination

frequently

occurs."

J.A.

at 70.

The plan primarily

bases the need for an affirmative action program on the tradi tional

under representation of women

classifications,

______..,

promotion."

due

J.A.

in the

to "entrenched patterns

at 65.
'

. .
'<\ B e f ore
.
pos1t1ons.
. J oyce I s

•

app ~ n

~I

goal of

skilled

3

craft

females

to

positions

in hiring and

of 1~ killed craft

t , 't •h ere
.

in skilled craft positions and no women.
~l

job

For example, the position of Road

Dispatcher is within the job classification

a

relevant

-~
2 38

wer ~

The Agency had set

f i 11 55 expected vacanc es
during

the

t')/1..0

year

that

in the

Joyce

was

hired.
After he was denied the promotion, petr brought suit
in federal DC under Title VII, claiming that the Agency had

•

~

me ~,~

page 5.

unlawfully discriminated
sex.

against

him of

the

standard

articulated

in

~ni ted

Weber, 443

u.s.

voluntary

employer-adopted

his

signed

to break down
( 2)

heirarchy";

discharge

that

~ re:
that

and

of

white

action

plan.

The

(1) that the plan was "de-

~atterns

of

[gender)

segregation

the plan did not "unnecessarily
[male)

employees" by requiring

replacement with

the plan did not

advancement

Steelworkers of America v.

affirmative

trammel the interest of the
their

The DC applied the

193 (1979) for determining the validity of a

factors articulated in

(3)

of

Resp offered the affirmative action plan as the legal

justification for its employment action.

and

basis

new

[female)

hirees;

"create an absolute bar to the

[male)

employees;

plan was a "temporary measure .••

and

( 4)

that

the

not intended to maintain

[gender) balance but simply to eliminate a manifest [genderl
imbalance."
The DC found
cant and

tha~oyce's

her selection.

that ~

was th t?2ost qualified appli-

gender was "the determining factor" in

The DC determined that the affirmative ac-

tion plans did not justify the failure to promote petr because the Agency failed to demonstrate that the plans were
"a temporary measure intended to eliminate a manifest imbalance in the work force •.• but instead, were and are interpreted

in such a

fashion so as to attempt to maintain an

ongoing balance."

The DC concluded that the Agency's action

"unnecessarily trammeled

[petr' s)

interests and had the ef-
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feet

of creating

an absolute

bar

to his

promotion to the

position of Road Dispatcher."
The CA9
district

reversed.

The CA9

court misapprehended

fide affirmative action plan."
district court,

... that th[e]

the

found

first,

requirements

"that the
for

a

CJt 1

bona

The CA9 found "[u]nlike the
emphasis on 'attainment'

[in

the affirmative action plan] does 'have the effect of ending
preferential treatment to women'

once parity is achieved."

Thus,

'
"sufficiently

it

Second,

found

the ·- Agency

plan

tempo ~ ary."

~

the CA9 held that to adopt a lawful affirmative ac-

tion plan "an employer need not show its own history of purIt

is sufficient for the employer

to show a conspicuous imbalance in the work force."

"'--

ly,

Final-

~..........--

the CA9 rejected petr's argument that the selection of

Joyce operated as a complete bar

to his selection for

the

position:
The instant case differs from W~ber ... in that it
does not involve the admission of numerous applicants into a training program.
Rather, it concerns the selection of one a licant for a single
opening.
When
ere 1s but one opening, the sel ectlbn of one candidate will necessarily result
in the exclusion of all others.
Unless we are
shown a distinct pattern of exclusion of nonminority candidates from such positions, we cannot
conclude that a single emplo~ment deci ~ ion serves
as a b ar o r unnecess ar i Ty trammels the interests
of other employees. -~
The CA9

thus concluded that the Agency plan "falls on the

permissible side of the line."
III.
A.

Analysis

Potential Mootness

l,'

....tJ . •

_

, • • __

.

~ · ·
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Petr was promoted to the position of Road Dispatcher, from which he retired in 1985.

Pursuant to the judgment

---~

entered by the DC petr

received all forms of compensation

and benefits relating to the original denial of his promotion,

as well as

reasonable attorneys'

poss!b~ema~ning ~

fees.

in the case pertains to

---........_...__.--....__----------........-·~ ~__......,___,-.-~,____'"

~id\._ to

\.._

him.
.

maining issue, the case would be moot.
416

u.s.

312 (1974)

~- P~l-v

~~~
~J.9-Gs
cn<-~~

~

~~

Petr' s only

~er. ~

__

the County can obtain reimbursement of the attorneys'
and damage amounts alre

c~~~~

fees

....__.- --~···· ......_..____

Without this re-

DeFunis v. Odegaard,

(law student's race discrimination claim

moot because he had nearly graduated from law school by the
time of the suit).

The Transportation Department notes this

issue in its brief but does not take a definite position as
to

whether

reimbursement

will

be

sought.

This

should

be

ascertained at oral argument.
B.
1.

Mode of Analysis

Title VII vs. Equal Protection Analysis

Petr has thus
affirmative

action

"Although there

far

plan

pursued only 'a challenge to the

under

Title VII.

is state action

The

in this case,

CA9
•.•

noted,
Johnson

did not challenge the affirmative action plan on equal protection grounds and we do not reach the issue."
at 754 n. 1.
challenge

770 F.

2d

This Court has recently indicated that where a

comes

to

this Court

under Title VII only,
....___~

this

Court will "leave questions regarding the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment
district court."

••.

to further proceedings before the

Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106

s.

( /} ~

"JJr..-01-
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Ct. 3063, 3073 n. 8

(1986).

Petr and the SG argue that the

prohibitions of Title VII should be read to be coextensive
with

those

the

of

Equal

Protection

But,

Clause.

are

Jackson

distinct
Board

(1986).

of

rebuts

this

e§Y v.

argument.

~ G/P

VI/

this

Court's repeated and recent indications that the two inquiries

~?& ~J

Wk

)._.,~

~..--...

3 ~~
~~
the proper analysis in this case is

Education,

Consequently,

106

s.

Ct.

1842,

1846

n.

under Title VII only.
As noted by the DC, the case which sets the standard
for

voluntary employer-adopted affirmative action plans

Weber.
ty.

In Weber, however, the employer was a private enti-

But,

this Court has noted that "Congress expressly in-

dicated

the

applied

to

Dothard v.

intent

that

the

governmental
Rawlinson,

same Title VII

and

private

433 U.S.

321,

principles be

employers

331 n.

14

permissible under Title VII,
fact

ti ves,

that Congress

and

union

intended

freedoms

greatest extent possible."
Rep.

No.

the Court

(1977).

that

be
443

in Weber

u.s.

In

relied on

undisturbed ot

at 206

914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.

(quoting H.

2, p.

29

/U- h..

1"2--1-~

~~~-~
aff· ~~

~~

~..e-rs

11I.

~

plans -~--~

"management preroga-

left

lA/~

alike." -~f/.J..;~

finding voluntary employer-adopted affirmative action

the

is

the
R.

(1963)).

This Court has recently noted:
Title VII was expanded to cover municipalities [in
1972] • . . . Although the legislative history of the
1972 amendments does not reflect the same concern
with preserving the managerial discretion of governmental employers that was evident in 1964 with
respect to the private sector, there is also no
indication that Congress intended to leave '' ove rnmff a ,__ emplo.,¥ers w1t
e
a !..: u e under Title
V I than had been l~ to employers in the pr i vate
sector when Title VII was originally enacted.

~..t..-y.-z...

1

Local No. 93, 106

...........

page 9.

s. Ct. at

3075 n.

10.

Thus,

it appears

that the Title VII standard for voluntary affirmative action
plans established in Weber should

·~

to public as well as

private employers. ; ' Justice O'C~ has explicitly adopted this point of vie\\1-:-

-------·

~
1
Because this is a Title VII action, analysis should
proceed primarily under Weber. Nevertheless, it is not clear
that the constitutional hurdles for an affirmative action plan
are significantly greater than the Title VII hurdles. First,
this Court has not determined whether the constitutional standard
developed for racial classifications in affirmative action plans
should apply to sex-based classifications. The standard
articulated in Wygant sterns in part from the view that any racial
classification must meet the "compelling interest standard".
But, this Court has not found the compelling interest standard
applicable to sex-based classifications. Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan, 458 u.s. 718, 7245 <1982); University of
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302-303 <Powell, J.)
("Gender-based distinctions are less likely to create the
analytical and practical problems present in preferential
/H.Cf~
programs premised on racial or ethnic criteria."). Thus, it is
not immediately obvious that the standard articulated in Wygant ~t
~
to a sex-based affirmative action plan.

\

!is applicable

~~r-

A.-1--~
~ , even under the equal protection analysis
~k>
articul ~ Wygant, analysis would not be significantly
different. Wygant required first, that a public employer "have
·~ ''
sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has been ~
prior discrimination" 106 S. Ct. at 1848. This element
~
corresponds to the first prong of the Weber test -- that a plan
be "designed to break down old patterns of segregation." The
second Wygant requirement is that the means to remedy the
~~
discrimination be "narrowly tailored". This requirement
fwY'
corresponds to a number of prongs of the Weber test -- that the
p~
plan not "unnecessarily trammel" nonrninorities' rights, that it
./,.
not create a absolute bar to nonrninorities' advancement, and that
~
the plan be temporary. Because the factors articulated in Wygant .,
A/A
are implicit in the Weber test, the constitutional and the Title
VII inquiries into the validity of affirmative action programs
pi-·
appear substantially similar.

c .~~

't

·
·
n1
as a po 1'1cy matter 1t
1s
not c 1 ear t h at
~
affirrna
action plans adopted by public employers should be ~~ .. ~
subject to greater scrutiny than those adopted in the private ~~
~
sector. Public employers, especially at the county level like ~ ~~.
the resp here, are responsive to their constituency. It should ~~
(Footnote continued)
t1 ~ .,._
~..u-

,.,..,/~~~.-.. ~ zf..v
~:a:~~

~·
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The value of voluntary compliance is doubly important when it is a public employer that acts, both
because of the example its voluntary assumption of
responsibility sets and because the remediation of
governmental discrimination is of unique importance.
[It would be an] anomalous result that
what private employers may voluntarily do to correct apparent violations of Title VII, ... Weber,
public employers are ... forbidden to do to correct their statutory ... transgressions.
Wygant, 106

s.

Ct. at 1855.
2.

The SG,

Burdens of Proof

bolstered

by Judge Wallace's dissent
the~l ?~ r's

the CA9 decision, argues that

from

assertion of an

affirmative action plan should be treated as an affirmative
defense

upon

According
case,

to

which
the

the

normal

employer
burdens

has
of

the
proof

burden of proof.
in

a

Title VII

after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
,•

discrimination,
crimina tory

~ he

reason

employer need only articulate a nondisfor

the employment action

in question.

The plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that

the

articulated

unlawful discrimination.

justification is a pretext for

The SG's theory is that an affirm-

ative action plan is actually discriminatory so its articu'-

lation does not constitute a nondiscriminatory reason for an

(Footnote 1 continued from previous page)
not lightly be assumed that they will adopt an employment plan
which disadvantages the members of the majority of their
constituency without substantial justification. Moreover,
because public entities are subject to public scrutiny, it can be
assumed that they will monitor and revise their employment
practices frequently so as to avoid public condemnation.

I
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employment action.

The SG also emphasizes that the employer

is better able to prove the validity of the plan.
gument

is

not

brought

by

a

1

persuasive,

minority

because

individual

in

a

This ar-

Title

claiming

VII

case

discrimination,

the employer is similarly in a better position to prove that
the employment decision was made on the basis of nondiscriminatory criteria.
in a

civil case

Nevertheless,
is

that

the normal

b~ den

the plaintiff has

the

of proof

burden of

~

proving the required elements of an
ance of

the evidence.

off~ reponder

The Court recently reaffirmed this

-....__,_

principle in the context of an equal protection challenge in
Wygant.

Ct.

106 S.

at 1848

("The ultimate burden remains

with the employer to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of
an affirmat{ve action program.").

Thus far,

has been applied in Title VII cases.
compelling

reason

to

alter

this

this principle

There appears to be no

allocation

of

proof

Title VII cases involving affirmative action plans.

for

In re-

ality, the allocation of proof will not make a great deal of
difference since most Title VII cases will proceed
third

stage of proof where

the

trier

of

to the

fact must decide

whether an affirmative action plan is more likely than not a
valid reason for the employment action.
is

that where

the evidence

will be presumed
the

valid.

congressional goal of

is equally balanced,

the plan

This result better comports with
voluntary compliance with Title

VII.
C.

The only difference

Application

Tr~

~~

!>-(~
T t..-l'i&TJTr

lA-v

c.~.

)$~
1-uL~~

~~

--
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the case which sets the standard for

To reiterate,
voluntary
Weber.

---------..

affirmative

action

programs

under

Title VII

This standard contains four elements:

(1)

is

the plan

is "designed to break down old patterns of [gender] segregation and heirarchy";

( 2)

the plan does not "unnecessarily

trammel the interest of the
their
( 3)

discharge

and

the plan does

[male]

employees" by requiring

replacement with

not

new

[female]

"create an absolute bar

vancement of white [male] employees;

and

"temporary measure

to

not

intended

(4)

ance.ri

/2-A!-./-v

/L/-~~

~-~--~
II/A~~
-4~

hirees;

to the ad-

the plan is a

maintain

balance but simply to eliminate a manifest

lJ~

[gender]

[gender]

imbal-

The Court did not indicate that each of these ele-

ments was essential,

but merely that these features caused

the particular affirmative action plan at issue to fall "on
the permissible side of the line."

1.
The DC found

443

u.s.

at 208.

Remedial Purpose
that "[t] he Transportation Agency has

not discriminated in the past, and does not discriminate in
the present against women in regard to employment opportunities

in

general

and

promotions

in

particular."

The

CA9

stated:
The DC apparently assumed that an employer must CH q ~
show his own history--o-r' pur oseful discriminatory
~
patterns or practices.
n em lo er need o make
any such showing.
Thus, the DC's actual finding ./..o ~
of ~ present discrimation against women '~
by this employer is irrelevant to the issue of the
~
validity of the affirmative action program.

t...r

770 F. 2d at 758.

for the employer to show a

,~~·~ is

sufficient
its work

page 13.

force."

Id.

The CA9 gleaned this rule frQm Weber, observ-

ing that in that case, the employer "did not engage in purposeful discrimination" but that because of the statistical
disparity between the work force and the local labor market,
"the employer was justified in adopting an affirmative action plan."
In

Id.
Weber,

union entered

Kaiser

Aluminum

and

its

steelworkers'

into a collective bargaining agreement which

contained an affirmative action plan "designed to eliminate
conspicuous racial imbalances in Kaiser's then almost exclusively white

craftwork

forces."

443

u.s.

at

198.

Black

crafts hiring goals were set for each Kaiser plant equal to
the

percentage

forces.
job

of

blacks

in

the

respective

local

labor

To enable the plants to meet these goals, on-the-

training

programs

were established

to

teach

unskilled

production workers -- black and white -- the skills necessary to become craftworkers.

Entry into the plan was based

on seniority, except that the plan reserved 50% of the openings in the training program for black employees.

The Court

found the plan's purpose to be "to break down old patterns
fo racial segregation and hierarchy."
explicit finding

u.s.

at 208.

No

of past discrimination by Kaiser was

in-

cluded in the plan.

443

The only basis for the Court's finding

of this purpose was that "[j)udicial findings of exclusion
from crafts on

racial grounds

such

a

exclusion

proper

"[a) s a consequence

are

subject

so numerous

for

judicial

as to make
notice"

and

[of this exclusion from craft unions],

Lt/~
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only 1.83%

(5 out of 273)

of the skilled craftworkers

were black, even though the work force ... was approxirnately 39% black."

443

u.s.

at 198-199 & n. 1.

Thus, Weber

does not require a finding by the employer that it engaged
in purposeful discrimination,

but may require that statis-

tics which

indicate segregation be tied to some source of
··~
discrimination.
~-"'
Although articulated in the context of an equal protection challenge,
statistical

-

proof

this Court's recent statement regarding
regarding

employer

affirmative

~~ ~f

../....e_

~

action

plans is instructive:
This Court has never held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to ] ustify a racial classification.
Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior disrirnination by
the governrnent:al unit invollve a b efore a l lowing
limited use of racial classifications in order to
remedy such discrimination.
This Court's reasoning in Hazelwood School District v. United States,
433 U.S. 299 (1977), illustrates that the relevant
analysis in cases involving proof of discr irnination by statistical disparity focuses on those
disparities that demonstrate such prior governmental discrimination.
[T] he Court in Hazelwood
held that the proper comparison for determining
i"lMA~ L~~--l
the existence of actua i- disc ri~~e [ern- \ ··~-,
, . ,ployer] '-¥a.,s
~~composition of
~w
~
[the employer's] staff and the racial composition
'11
·
of the qualified individuals in the relevant labor
_ ~~
market.'
433 u.s. at 308.
~ ~ ~

~~k

Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847.
"Where

gross

statistical

In Hazelwood, the Court
disparities

can

be

stated, ~

shown,

they

alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a
pattern or practice of discrimination."
308.

433

u.s.

at 307-

.e~

~~\
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It appears that statistics can justify an employer's

__

ad~tion ~! a~--af~m~~c:_~ n

~ those statistics

would be sufficient to constitute a prima facie case under
Title VII.

This

burden of proof makes

sense,

because an

employer cannot be expected to make particularized findings
of its own purposeful discrimination.

Statistics can estab-

lish an inference of discrimination without pinpointing specific

blame

and

subjecting

prior discrimination.

the

employer

to

liability

for

Title VII was intended to encourage

voluntary achievement of its goals.

This burden of proof to

Thus,

o--t~~.
~ j-v-vt.Z

~~
' « "ijj!iiii!- 1-

/:;I

~~

/A.,~~

~·

~tul
~A/4~
~PD

~

action~

establish the prima facie validity of an affirmative
plan appears to strike the correct balance.

~~

statis- ~

tics alone can justify
----... an employer's adoption of an affirmative action plan if the statistics are:

(1) based on a com-

parison of the minorities in the employer's work force with
the qualified minorities in the labor pool; and

(2)

strong

enough that discrimination as the basis of the disparity can
be inferred.
The

affirmative

percentage of women

action plan at

issue compares

in each of seven EEOC

tions with the percentage of women

the

job classifica-

in the countywide work

force,

based on the national
census done in 10-year inter________.,

vals.

The

plan

seeks

ultimately

to

"attain a

work

force

whose composition in all job levels and major job classifications approximates

the distribution of women

[county]

work force."

achieved

through

a

J.A.

at 54.

..•

in the

The long-range goal is

series of short-range goals which seek

~ ~
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gradually to integrate women into all job categories.
ther the overall goal,
are

formed

force

with

by

nor the goals for each job category

comparing

the

Nei-

the women

qualified women

in

in

the employer's work

the county work
e._

-- --

with a more specific work force

---~women

be

issue,

force.

,,

However, for the ~articular position ~t issue, a comparison
--..._,

required.

only

one

The

step

position

up

from

at

Road

at large may not

Road

Dispatcher,

Maintenance Worker,

a

manual

labor position requiring no measurable qualifications.
position
male

of

until

Road
1975

Maintenance

Worker

when Joyce moved

had

into

been

is

The

exclusively

the position.

The

only route to the position of Road Dispatcher is through the
Road Maintenance Worker promotion ladder.

Because the only

"qualification" for being a Road Dispatcher is being a Road
Maintenance Worker,

and

Worker

measurable

requires

no

the

position

of

Road

Maintenance

qualifications,

it

may

be

proper to compare the women in the skilled craft position
with the women in the entire work force.
Weber,
and

Moreover, like in

the exclusion of women from skilled craft positions

from apprenticeship programs

leading

to employment

in

such jobs has been noted by many courts and thus may be appropriate for

judicial notice.

2d

1982);

257

(CADC

Thompson v. Sawyer,

Local Union No.

Assocation of Electrical Workers
F.2d 416

(CA2 1980)

v.

35 of

678 F.

International

City of Hartford,

625

Davis v. Richmond, Fredricksburg & Po-

tomac Railway Co., 593 F. Supp. 271 (ED Va. 1984).

1trr-

~

~~
(

~/l.~

~~

~),
~~~

~-&___

L.vz.J..L.

~

a./-~t~~
~~

~~
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As to the second prong of the above test, the overall percentage

in the employer's work

force

pared to 36.4% working women in the county.
alone is not striking.

RPraprofessional

This disparity

Within each job category,

the disparities are much more pronounced.
gor~ s,

is 22.4% com-

and

clerical,

however,

In two job catewomen

are

grossly

overrepresented at 90% and 75.9% of the work force respec..-:::.:--~

--------v

tively.

In the other five categories they are underrepre-

sented.

The most striking statistic is that before the pro-

motion at issue, out of 238 skilled craft workers, none were
female.
If it is appropriate to look at the plan as a whole
"':!

to determine whether the promotion at issue is justified by
a remedial purpose, then the plan may suffer from two problems:

~ its ~s are set by the population of working

women
at large, rather than according to the number of qual_____..

------

------------.--~~----------------

ified women in the work force;

~

the overall dispari-

ty between men and women may not be significant enough to
compel an inference of prior discrimination. 2

But, petr in

2
Because of the CA9's op1n1on, this Court is faced with the
question of when a conspicuous statistical imbalance can be used
to infer prior discrimination. The CA9 coul~ have relied on
numerous statements in the affirmative action plan to find an
appropriate remedial purpose. For example, the Agency notes the
need "to remedy the effects of past . practices," J.A. at 31, one
of which is t..he "hidden . discrimination" in "the selection and
appointment processes." J.A. at 70. As another example, the
plan notes, as one . factor hindering goal attainment that "[m]any
women are not strongly motivated to seek employment in job
classifications where they have not been traditionally employed
because of the limited opportunities that have existed in the
past for them to work in such classifications." J.A. at 57. Why
(Footnote continued)
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this action only has standing to challenge the affirmative
action plan as applied to him.

the record is only developed

as to this particular application of the plan.

As applied

to petr, the plan appears to be based on a significant disparity

which

proves

its

remedial

purpose.

First,

the

in the relevant job classification is significant enough to lead to an inference of prior
discrimination.
may not

have

Second,

been

as

indicated above,

required to isolate

the employer

"qualified" workers

from the entire work force to create a relevant comparison.
Consequently,

as applied in this case,

have an appropriate remedial purpose.

the plan appears to
Employers should be

on notice that as applied to jobs which require specifically
"qualified"

workers,

statistics

which

isolate

the

"quali-

fied" work force will be required.
2.

Infringement on Male Employees' Rights

It is appropriate to consider the second and third
~

prongs of
whether

an

th ~ te~ ether

~ment

action

because the questions of

"unnecessarily

trammels

the

interests" of male employees o ~ whether it "creates an absolute bar"

to

their

advancement are closely related.

Petr

(Footnote 2 continued from previous page)
the DC ignored these statements and found that the Agency had not
discriminated in the past is unclear. There is some indication
in the briefs that both parties asked the DC to find no prior
discrimination. Although this is speculation, the Agency may
have been concerned about potential Title VII liability to past
employees.
In any event, these veiled admissions support the
inference to be drawn from gross statistical disparities.

0w-t ~~;:
1AJ'j"i--argue

and

that

promotions

are

~~~~~~

1-o

~
~J..-V~~ ~~•
closer to layoffs, 5
l'~

Wygant found not appropriately subject to
irmative action plans.

firmative

Resp argues that promotions are

~

k> ".,{!..~- tY/1-

action goals.

~

The decision in Wygant rested on

often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, layoffs
the

entire

burden of

achieving

racial

equality on

~t~
LA--

Wttq~
:.......:--

individuals,
tion of their lives."
to the Court,

often resulting

in serious d i srup-

106 S. Ct. at 1851-1852.

According

"Denial of a future employment opportunity is

not as intrusive as loss of an existing job" and "Layoffs
disrupt

settled expectations

oals do not."
It

in a way that general h.i-r ing

Id. at 1851.

appears

that

resp

has

the

better

argument,

at

least as applied to the promotion system at issue in this
case.

Here,

an

evaluating board creates a

list of seven

qualified individuals from which the director has the discretion to choose the individual to be hired.

Although the

list is created by test scores, the director is not required
to respect the rank order.

T~s, promotion is based in part ·~~ ~

on experience, but in large part on merit and on discretion-

~

ary decisions of superiors regarding the applicant's qualifications.
same way
The

t'

hiring goals which are permissibly subject to af-

the fact that "[w]hile hiring goals impose a diffuse burden,

impose

/--

~

Individuals must compete for promotions in the
that a

individual

job applicant must compete
has

no expectation

to get hired.

that he will get hired

7

ti ~
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beyond

the

expectation

that

if he

is evaluated

to be the

best applicant, he will get the position.
Based on the theory of Wygant,
to distinguish between
....

~---

1

~ompetitive

ll

\'

which rely only on seniority.
------~~--~~

it would make sense

-

-·--

promotions"and promotions
_..

If an individual receives a

promotion simply by being in a position for a certain amount
of time,

then he has an expectation that he will receive a

certain promotion.

There is no discretion involved in the

choice, and it is reasonable for the individual to rely and
plan his life on the expectation that he will be in the position at a certain time.
on merit

and

-------

on

But, where promotions are based

--

discretionary decisions

---

----.....__..._

-~---

---....___

by superiors,
-----------

no

individual can reasonably rely on receiving the promotion.
- - - - . . . . _ _. ...____

______ -·-··

-.......___.

---

Seniority only gives him the minimum qualifications and the
opportunity

to

compete.

Thus,

adding

affirmative

action

considerations to the other discretionary criteria does not
upset settled expections
considerations

to

a

in the same way that adding such

seniority-based

layoff

or

promotion

would.

In the Agency's promotion system, as

i~

the

gender of the applicant is one permissible "plus" factor to
-.
~
-::::::distinguish between other qualified applicants.
The Agency
is

not

required

to

fill

a

certain

number

of

slots

with

women, and an applicant's gender "does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the
available seats."

438 U.S. at 317.

The exact mechanism in

this case is that a section director is required to consult

~~
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with the EEO officer if he intends to
for a particular position.

sel~ct

a nonminority

This system implies that a di-

rector can consider gender along with other qualifications,
and if he concludes that the need for certain qualifications
outweighs the need to fulfill the affirmative action goal,
he

can

hire

"permit [s]

on

J.A.

indicates

nonminority

candidate.

hiring
at 61.

that

it

Moreover,

the

plan

as may be necessary because of

adjustments

limitations
force."

a

or

reductions

in

the

County

work

The apparent flexibility of the plan
is

less

intrusive

on

the

rights

of

nonminorities than would be a plan which established rigid
quotas with little opportunity for deviation.
The

system

as

applied

in

this case also does

not

-<::"

create an absolute bar to nonminority promotion.
1'---====::;::::;;:::::::::::::~~~-- --· ~

petr received a similar

- ../

pro~~~~~te~

the Court upheld an affirmative action plan which

In fact,
In Weber,

"JU;

~

~- ?eh-;
~~

reserved~~

50% of the openings in the training program for minorities. ~~
Here, only 3 out of 55 expected openings were in any sense ~~
"reserved",

and

these reservations

not a strict ratio as in Weber.

represented only goals,

Petr in this case retained

his job and retained the ability to compete for any future
openings.

He

advancement.

was

thus

not

completely

barred

from

future

He only lost the particular job in question.

The application of the promotion system in this case
illustrates that, in certain circumstances, consideration of
gender in a merit-based promotion can be a permissible part
of an affirmative action plan under Title VII.
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3.

Temporary Nature of the Plan

In finding the affirmative action plan invalid, the
DC

relied primarily on

its

finding

that

the plan was not

temporary, but instead was designed to maintain a sexuallyrepresentative work force.

The CA9 reevaluated the plan and

came to the opposite conclusion.

Unless an employer is re-

quired to state an explicit ending date in order for a plan
to be deemed temporary,
consistently
tain."

uses

The quote

permanent

appears

the

the CA9 appears correct.
word

relied
to

"attain"

as

opposed

The plan
to

upon by the DC to find

have been

"main-

the plan

read out of context.

The

director of the Transportation Agency did not say that the
plan

was

a

permanent

part

of

the

agency's

operating

philospohy, but that the broader goal of affirmative action
was.

The director went on the explain:
So the broader goal is divorced, if you will, from
specific numbers or percentages.
In terms of the
desire to hire, to promote, to give opportunity
and training on an equitable, non-discriminatory
basis as part of out operating philosophy, that is
a permanent part.

Pet.

A at 15a n.

1.

Thus,

the DC's conclusion that "the

Affirmative Action Plan is a permanent part of the agency's
operating

philophy"

appears

erroneous.

Second,

the

DC

faulted the agency for having "no specific time table as to
when everyone within the agency will receive an equal opportunity."

But,

employers may not legally establish quotas,

they may only set goals.
plan,

As part of the affirmative action

the agency repeatedly emphasized that even the goals

C::4 "f

~

J1~~

~
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would be difficult to obtain and thus were not rigid.
very

lack

rigidity

of

the

increases

The

opportunity

nonminorities to compete for position openings.

of

To find the

plan permanent because it does not set a definite time table
appears to elevate form over substance.

Finally, the focus

in this case must be on how the plan was applied.
be

no

argument

that

by

promoting

a

female

There can

over

petr

the

Agency was merely maintaining a balanced work force because
the work force was blatantly unbalanced.

It would only be

proper at some later time to charge that the Agency is maintaining

as

opposed

to

attaining

a

sexually

balanced

work

force.
IV.

Conclusion

This case was brought ~nly under Title VII
proper standard for analysis is Weber.

so the

The CA9 found that a

"conspicuous imbalance" in an employer's work force can justify

the

employer's

act ion plan.

Read

interpretation of

voluntary

adoption

of

an

in connection with Weber,
the

DC' s

finding

that

the

affirmative
and with

its

employer

had

engaged in no prior purposeful discrimination, what the CA9
means is that a statistiqal disparity in an employer's work

--

-----

force can justify the adoption of an affirmative action plan

---------------

~

if the disparity is:

---

ber of minorities

(1)

based on a comparison of the num-

in a particular

job classification with

the number of minorities in the relevant population with the
relevant
prior

qualifications

and

(2)

significant

discriminatory practices can be

enough

inferred.

that

There

is

-
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some question as to whether the affirmativ.e action plan at
issue

as

a

whole meets

these

two

requirements.

However,

because petr only has standing to challenge the plan as appl~,

whether

the appropriate analysis would appear

the plan

is

valid as applied to him.

to be

In his

job

classification, the statistical disparity appears both mean....

ingful and significant.

Moreover, the method of implementa-

tion is flexible so that the rights of nonminorities are not
unnecessarily trammeled, and petr is not forever barred from
job opportunity.
In sum, this affirmative action plan appears to be a
reasonable and responsible attempt by a public employer to
----~

fulfill

its obligations

under Title VII.

Contrary to the

SG's assertion, the plan does not appear to be "broad social
engineering," but instead appears to be directed at a specific and identifiable problem. ~he Court could follow the
DC' s

lead,

and

draw

every possible

inference

employer in interpreting the scope of the plan.

against

the

This would

have the result of deterring employers from adopting voluntary affirmative action plans thus requiring minority members to bring suit to correct the effects of past discrimi-

natio ~ The intent of Congress, however, was to encourage
voluntary compliance with Title VII.

There appears to be no

strong reason to apply this intent differently to public as
opposed to private employers.

Both public and private em-

ployers must be assumed to prefer to operate without burdensome hiring and promotion goals.

Thus, when employers vol-
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untarily adopt affirmative action plans, it , may be appropriate to defer to the employer's judgment that such a plan was
necessary
over,

to

remedy

the effects of past practices.

More-

it may be appropriate to assume that employers will

frequently

reevaluate their need for the burdensome proce-

dures and eliminate them once the remedy for past practices
has

been

achieved.

Particularly

in

the case of a county

transportation department, presumably responsive to a white
male constituency, deference to the judgment that an affirmative action plan was necessary may be appropriate.
A decision

in

this case should

be

limited

to

the

plan's validity under Title VII, and its validity as applied
~

to the particular promotion in question.
.....__.--. - -

.....__.. -...__

......._

........__.

The questions of

~

'-e

)

the validity of the plan under the Equal Protection Clause
and as a justification for some future employment action are
not properly presented in this case.
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lfp/ss 10/21/86 JOHNSON SALLY-POW
85-1129 Johnson v. Transportation Agency (CA9)
MEMO TO LESLIE:
This

is

~ affirmative

action case

involving the validity of a plan by respondent, a public
agency
memo

in California.
and

briefs.

also

have

I

now have

read

your

excellent

preliminarily

In view of your bench memo,

the

bench

principal

I will not write my

customary memo to the file.
You conclude that the affirmative action plan at
issue meets

the Weber

standard,

In view of

the safeguards of

and should be approved.

this particular plan

that

involves both short and long term "goals", with no quotas,
I am tentatively inclined to agree with you.
helpful,
memo.
never

however,

if

you

gave

As stated last Term,
agreed

on

act ion cases.

I

a

standard

me

a

brief

It would be
supplemental

a majority of the Court has
of

analysis

in

affirmative

am told that Professor Jeffries at the

University of Virginia states that I

am the only Justice

who knows what the standard is!
I
resolved
Fullilove,

have

written,

the problem of

as

you

know,

the colleges and

and last Term in Wygant.

in

Bakke

(that

universities),

In those cases that

2.

involved

alleged

fixed quotas,
and

the

I

showing

discrimination

against

minorities

and

spoke of the need for "strict scrutiny",
of

a

"compelling"

state

interest.

You

suggest that the standard in this respect may be different
with respect to women, and it is true that this Court has
not

applied

the

same

level

of

scrutiny

to

alleged

sex

discrimination that it has to race discrimination.
I need your help in identifying an analysis that
will be generally consistent with what I
previous cases.

have written in

This case perhaps can be decided fairly

easily by simply applying the Weber standards, but I doubt
that the opinion can be written without reference to the
type of analysis employed in equal protection as well as
Title VII cases.·
I

have not thought this through.

need or want a long supplemental memo.
McCleskey takes priority over this.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

But I

do not

Also, your work on

~g

10/31/86
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/
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~
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MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

October 31, 1986

Justice Powell
Leslie

No. 85-1129, Johnson v. Transportation Agency
You

asked

for

a

supplemental

memorandum

suggesting

a

standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause for the affirmative action plan at issue that would be consistent with your
previous writings in Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant.
In Wygant, you stated that the test for examining a racebased affirmative action plan has two prongs.
classification
interest.
its
goal.

must

Second,

purpose

must

be

justified

by

a

First, any racial

compelling

governmental

the means chosen by the State to effectuate
be

narrowly

tailored

to

achievement

of

that

page 2.

The first

important point is that the case at issue in-

volved sex, not race, discrimination.

In Wygant, you stated that

"the level of scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group that historically
has not been subject to governmental discrimination," 106 S. Ct.
at 1846, and you cited Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
458
for

u.s.

718, 724 n. 9 (1982).

The standard articulated in Hogan

sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause

is that "the party seeking

to uphold a statute that classifies

individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of
showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification."

458

u.s.

u.s.

461

(1981);

Personnel

256,

(1979)).

455,

Feeney,

442

u.s.

at 724

273

(citing Kirchberg v.

Feenstra,

Administrator

of

Mass.

450
v.

"The burden is met only by

showing at least that the classification serves

'important gov-

ernmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed'
are

'substantially

tives.'"

458

Ins.

446 U.S.

Co.,

sex-based
Bakke, 438

U.S.

related

to

at 724

(citing Wengler

142,

classifications

u.s.

sification as

at 303

150
is

the

achievement

(1980)).

v.

of

those

objec-

Druggists Mutual

This lesser scrutiny for

consistent

with

your

opinion

in

("[T]he Court has never viewed such clas-

inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or

ethnic classifications for the purpose of equal protection analysis.").
Admittedly,

applying

the standard that has been articu-

lated as to sex-based classifications to affirmative action plans
will have

the anomalous

result that a State will find

it more

.

page 3 .

•

difficult to justify a race-based affirmative action plan than to
justify a sex-based plan.
tiny

standard

evolved

The anomaly is that the stricter scru-

for

race

because of

the perception that

individuals suffered greater discrimination because of race than
because of sex.

It then might be argued that the State should

have greater latitude to remedy the greater past discrimination.
The anomaly is lessened,

however,

if the standards of scrutiny

are viewed in terms of classifications.

This Court has articu-

lated a strong constitutional policy of achieving a society that
does not employ racial classifications.

The constitutional poli-

cy

is

regarding

sex-based

classifications

less

strong.

Viewed

this way, it makes sense for the Court to treat all racial classifications
Moreover,

and

all

sex-based

classifications

consistently.

it is unlikely in practice that the difference in se-

mantics will lead to different evaluations of affirmative action
plans based on the type of classification.

The difference be-

tween "exceeding persuasive" and "compelling", and between "substantially related" and "narrowly tailored", does not appear substantial.
In sum, to justify a sex-based affirmative action plan, a
State must show that it has an "exceedingly persuasive" governmental objective, and that the means employed are "substantially
related" to the achievement of the objective.

Once the slightly

different standard of scrutiny is articulated, then the standards
in the race-based affirmative action cases are relevant to determine what constitutes

a

permissible governmental objective and

what means are permissible to achieve that objective.

page 4.

The governmental objective must be remedial and must be
directly at past discrimination by the governmental entity.

A

purpose to remedy the effects of general societal discrimination
is not sufficient.

The primary unresolved question is what type

of evidence a governmental entity must have to justify an affirmative action plan.

You stated in Bakke and Fullilove that find-

ings of past discrimination are required.

Bakke, 438

u.s.

at 307

("We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense
of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative,

or

tions.");

administrative
Fullilove,

448

findings

u.s.

of

at 498

constitutional

viola-

("[T)he governmental body

must make findings that demonstrate the existence of illegal discrimination.").

It appears in Wygant that a determination by a

trial court that the state employer "had a strong basis in evidence for

its conclusion that remedial action was necessary" is

sufficient

to

meet

the

"findings"

requirement.

That

is,

the

state employer itself need not make explicit findings that it had
engaged

in

prior

illegal

discrimination.

Justices

Marshall,

Brennan,

and Blackmun in dissent read this to be the meaning of

the Court opinion in Wygant, as does Justice O'Connor in her concurrence.

106

s.

Ct.

at 1853

(O'Connor,

J.,

concurring)

("The

remedial purpose need not be accompanied by contemporaneous findings of

actual

discrimination

to be

accepted

as

legitimate as

long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required.").

page 5.

Assuming that contemporaneous findings are not required,
the next question is what type of evidence provides an employer
with a "strong basis in evidence" or a "firm basis for believing"
that remedial action is required.

Under Equal Protection princi-

ples, statistics should be sufficient if they can lead to an inference of prior discrimination.

Gross underrepresentation of a

particular class in the work force should be enough.

Other evi-

dence of prior exclusion from the work force could support the
statistics where the statistics alone might not lead to an inference of discrimination.

Any statistics should be "meaningful" in

that they represent a correlation between the population in the
work force and the qualified working population of the relevant
area.
Once the "exceedingly persuasive"
discrimination
whether

the

objective.

in

the

work

force

found,

means

are

"substantially

justification of prior
the

related"

next
to

question
the

is

remedial

In Wygant, you found that layoffs could never be con-

sidered narrowly tailored to meet a remedial objective.

Presum-

ably they also can never be "substantially related" to a remedial
objective.

In determining what other means can be "substantially

related" to as remedial objective,
Fullilove
action

regarding

plan are

the

scope

instructive.

of
The

the standards articulated in
a

race-conscious

relevant considerations are:

(1) the efficacy of alternative remedies;
tion of the remedy;

(3)

affirmative

(2)

the planned dura-

the relationship between the percentage

of minority workers to be benefited and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or work force;

and

page 6.

(4)

the availability of waiver provisions

tives could not be met.

448 U.S. at 510.

if the plan's objecA fifth consideration

articulated in Wygant is the relative burden on nonminority employees.

The last two considerations can incorporate the princi-

ple that "goals" are permissible because they allow for variance
to

ameliorate

the

potentially

harsh

impact

on

innocent

nonminorities in certain circumstances.
Applying the above considerations depends on the facts of
the case.

In this case, the affirmative action plan appears to

be justified by a persuasive remedial objective.

Its means also

appear substantially related to the objectives.

First, there do

not appear to be alternatives that could meet the remedial need
in a reasonable time frame.

Second, the plan appears to be tem-

porary and intended only to remedy past imbalances, not maintain
a work force balance.

Third, the goals set appear reasonable in

light of the number of women in the work force and the population.

Fourth,

the plan employs "goals" as opposed to "quotas."

Thus, all employees can compete for every available slot.

Final-

ly,

Promo-

the burden on nonminorities does not appear severe.

tion goals, at least where promotions are based on merit, appear
to be like hiring goals where their effect can be diffused among
a wide range of workers.
As the above

standards

indicate,

the

inquiry under

the

Equal Protection Clause is not that much different from the Title
VII standards for affirmative action plans articulated in Weber.
The only real difference appears to be in the "fit" required between the ends and the means.

Under Title VII, Congress has ex-

page 7.

pressed a policy favoring voluntary employer action.
ly,

Consequent-

the Court may accord employers greater latitude in choosing

the means to meet a remedial purpose whereas with public employers the Constitution requires rigorous scrutiny despite the statutory preference.
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MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

November 13, 1986

Justice Powell
Leslie

No. 85-1129, Johnson v. Transportation Agency
I.

Title VII

This case is brought under Title VII.

Title VII applies

the same to private and public employers.
is the proper standard.

Under Title VII, Weber
.
Weber requires that a voluntary affirma-

tive action plan meet the following requirements:
1.

the plan was designed to break down old patterns of

gender segregation and heirarchy;
2.

the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the interests

of the male employees';
3.

the plan did not create an absolute bar to the ad-

vancement of male employees;

page 2.

4.

the plan was a temporary measure,

not intended to

maintain gender balance but simply to eliminate a manifest gender
imbalance.
The affirmative action plan at issue meets these requirements.

Note that VWeber does not require findings of past dis•
fWl-v--~
=;;;:::,___ _ _ _ _"'-~-------crlmlnatlon by the employer. An imbalance in the work force is
.

•

--.-

-

enough.

A

~

You must decide whether you want to narrow Weber to re-

quire that all employers, public and private, show past discrimination before an affirmative action plan is valid under Title
l

VII.

L

,,

My feeling is that for a private employer, gross imbalance

in the work force should be enough.

Title VII was intended to

preserve management prerogatives to the greatest extent possible.
The chances that a private employer will erroneously adopt and

.-

maintain an affirmative action plan do not seem great.

Public

emplo ers will be subject to the additional requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause.

Thus, public employers will be required

to have a firm basis for believing that remedial action is necessary because of past discr iminator..y practices.
II.

Equal Protection Clause

Because this case involves

_

"· /.,..,,

A-~

('~ ~'11M/1.

--~~ Jo

~er,

~/J.?

it is also

necessary that the affirmative action plan meet the requirements
of

the Equal

Protection Clause.

The Equal Protection Clause

standards are not incorporated into Title VII;
rate.

--=:::::--..

they are sepa-

Because this is a sex discrimination case, the standard of

scrutiny

for

sex discrimination

is

appropriate.

The employer

must have an "exceedingly persuasive" objective and

the means

<~ ~-";-'~' .J
~~
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employed must be

1.

"substantially related"

to the achievement of

The employer must have a firm basis in evidence for

believing that an affirmative action plan is necessary to remedy
past discrimination.

The focus in this case is on the particular
\~

Yl job classification of Skilled Craft Worker.

The representation

...___~------~

of men to women in that classification was 230 to 0.
centage of women in the work force was 36.4%.

The per-

The employer did

not make findings as to the percentage of women in the qualified
labor pool.

Petr's reply brief indicates that the percentage of

women in the qualified labor pool was 5%.

To uphold the promo-

tion, the Court must be willing to say that the 230 to 0 disparity was

striki~n~~h

for believing

that

that the employer

could~~ firm

remedial action was necessary,

basis

even without

specific findings of past discrimination and absent specific comparisons

of

the

employer's work

force with

the

relevant

labor

pool.
2.

The plan must be "substantially related" (or "narrow-

ly tailored")
erations

are:

to its legitimate objective.
(1)

the

efficacy of

the planned duration of the remedy;

The relevant consid- tJ~I

alternative
( 3)

remedies;

( 2)

the relationship be-

tween the percentage of minority workers to be benefited and the
percentage of minority group members in the relevant population
or work force;

and (4)

the availability of waiver provisions if

the plan's objectives could not be met.

A fifth consideration

articulated in Wygant is the relative burden on nonminority employees.

The last two considerations can incorporate the princi-

page 4.

ple that "goals" are permissible because they allow for variance
to

ameliorate

the

potentially

harsh

impact

on

innocent

nonminorities in certain circumstances.
The

affirmative

these requirements.

action

plan

at

issue

appears

to

meet

The only potential problem is that the em-

player did not gauge his goals by the qualified work force.

Petr

was denied a promotion when only the long term goals of the plan
were in effect.

The long term goal was to achieve proportional

representation of
tions.

~:r:suh~;:
V{

u

women

and minorities

in

all
-;:::.....

job classifica-

But since petr's denial of promotion, resp has developed ~~
The short term goals (1) provide an objective 1~1-v
term g!lals.
~A/
to division directors of where underrepresentation exists

;f

Y:

d

affirmative

action

is

required;

(2)

provide

an objective ~~

andard of when representation is at a reasonable level in com-

4

parison with the estimates of the qualified persons in the area;

~

and (3) permit adjustment of the hiring goals as may be necessary

v,

;,.
k
/

\/~.

due ~~- unforeseen circumstances.

------------

These goals seem flexible and
~ (

,\

and take into account the qualified work force.
"'\,__----

~

Al-

'-.-- \_---·~

~ ~though petr was denied a promotion when only the long term goals

~ wo re
~ fO resp
~

in effect,

the subsequent short term goals indicate that

planned to tailor

its program to the appropriate remedial

;r:o~~·
~J~

~

III.
There are two hurdles

the~ployer

Conclusion
in this case.

The first is that

did not gauge the affirmative action goals according

to the qualified labor force.
long term goals.

This problem applies only to the

The short term goals are set according to the

page 5.

number

of qualified minority

individuals expected to apply for

the particular job classification.

Thus,

this problem does not

appear severe.

lit.<.. .

9

The biggest question f or yeu 1s to what degree yeu want
to modify your position that specific findings of past discrimination are necessary to justify an affirmative action plan under
the Equal Protection Clause.

Here, there is an explicit finding

by the DC that no past discrimination occurred.
Protection Clause a

-----

----=------

Under the Equal

stark statistical imbalance can lead to an

inference of past purposeful discrimination.
You must decide if
._._--- "---"'-.---- ~
.wt. ~
you are willing to find the adoption of the plan, and A the denial
of petr' s

promotion,

justified on the basis of the statistical

imbalance despite the DC's finding.
As we noted, if you can get past these two hurdles, especially the second, then the promotion pursuant to the affirmative
action plan appears valid under both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 1, 1986

Re:

No. 85-1129-Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County, California, et al.

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~·
•

T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

iluprnnt ar01trl at tlrt ~tb iltatt•
Jru~ ~.

ar.

20~~~

CHAMBERS OF

December 1, 1986

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

85-1129 - Johnson v. Transportation Agency

Dear Bill,
I shall await the dissent.
Sincerely yoursr

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.in,rtmt ~Amft .Ltf tlft ~ittb .ihdts
'~lhulfinghm. ~. ~. 21T~~~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

December 2, 1986

Re:

No. 85-1129 - Johnson v. Transportation Agency

Dear Bill,
I will be preparing a dissent in the above case.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

~npunu

QfltUrl 4tf t4.t ~tb ~taft•

Jl'u-lfittgton. ~.

QI.

2Ll.;t~~

CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 2, 1986

Re:

85-1129 - Johnson v. Transportation
Agency

Dear Bill:
Please join me.

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.tnvrtutt Qfouri ttf tqt ~iftb ~tatt.tr
'Jl~lfington. !l.

Of.

21l~~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

December 2, 1986

Re: 85-1129 - Paul Johnson v. Transportation
Agency
Dear Bill:
Although I agree with substantial portions of your
proposed op1n1on in this case, and concur in the judgment, I
have one concern about the opinion in its present form.
Omitted from the proposed opinion is any discussion of the
precise findings necessary before an employer engages in
affirmative action.
As it is now written, the proposed op1n1on
suggests .that an employer need not point to evidence of even
an arguable violation of Title VII on its own part as long
the employer can point to a "manifest •.. • imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories." Op. 9-10 (quoting
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209
(1978)). Although perhaps Weber can be read as requiring
nothing more than a statistical imbalance, I do not think it
should be so interpreted.
#

In the Title VII context as in the Equal
Protection context, I believe that an employer must have a
firm basis for believing that remedial action is required.
In particular, in order to provide some measure of
protection to the interests of the employer's nonminority
employees, the statistical disparity used to justify the
affirmative action plan should be sufficient to support a
prima facie Title VII pattern or practice claim by
minorities or women. Under our case law, for jobs that
require particular skills a Title VII prima facie case
requires a comparison to the percentage of women in the work
force with the relevant qualifications. See Hazelwood
School District v. United States, 433 u.s. 299 (1977).
This analysis is not inconsistent with Weber. In
Weber, the affirmative action program involved a tra1ning
program for unskilled production workers. 443 u.s., at 198.
In that case, therefore, the "manifest racial imbalance" was
powerful evidence of prior race discrimination because the
relevant comparison was to the total percentage of blacks in
the labor force. In the instant case, however, the number

'l -

of women with the qualifications for entry into. the relevant
job classifications was quite small. A mere statistical
imbalance between the percentage of women in the work force
and the percentage of women in these jobs, therefore, did
not necessarily suggest past discrimination. If instead of
no women in the agency's skilled work jobs, women had held
20% of the skilled jobs, in my view an affirmative action
plan would not be justified despite the so-called
"statistical imbalance." If an employer is already hiring a
higher percentage of women than the percentage in the labor
force with the necessary qualifications, any affirmative
action program is, by definition, "unnecessarily
trarnrnel[ing] the interests" of male workers. 443 u.s., at
208 (emphasis added).
In its present form, the opinion already
implicitly recognizes the appropriateness of this approach
to the statistical imbalance necessary to justify an
affirmative action plan, see pages 12-13, but I believe that
this same analysis of the use of statistical evidence should
apply to the employer's decision to initiate an affirmative
action program as well as to the application of the plan in
actual employment decisions.
~ '·

..

In this case I am satisfied that the respondent
had a firm basis for adopting an affirmative action program.
The complete absence of women in the skilled jobs would have
been sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Title
VII. I will circulate something along these lines by way of
a partial concurrence as promptly as possible.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

I

I

I

~~uu

(!fourl rl tlf~ ~nitta .ita.tttt
JJattJri:ngton.lJ. OJ. 2n.;r,.,

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

December 3, 1986

No. 85-1129, Johnson v. Transportation Agency

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

lsg 12/03/86

MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

Justice Powell

December 3, 1986

Leslie
No. 85-1129, Johnson v. Transportation Agency
In Steelworkers v. Weber,

443 U.S.

19 3, 200

(19 79) , the

Court emphasized "the narrowness of [its] inquiry":
Since the [affirmative action plan at issue] does not
involve state action, this case does not present an
alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Further, since the ••• plan was
adopted voluntarily, we are not concerned with what
Title VII requires or with what a court might order to
remedy a past proved violation of the Act.
The only
question before us is the narrow statutory issue of
whether Title VII forbids private employers
from
voluntarily [adopting a] bona fide affirmative action
plan [] •
Ibid.

This is the narrow inquiry before the Court in Johnson.

Although the employer in this case is a public employer, only the
Title VII issue was raised, argued and decided below.

This Court has
intersection
First,

of

"Congress

recognized two principles respecting the

Title

VII

expressly

and

the

Equal

indicated

the

Protection
intent

that

Clause.
the

same

Title VII principles be applied to governmental and private ernployers alike."
(1977)

Dothard v.

(emphasis added).

Rawlinson,

433

u.s.

321,

Second, "a public ernployer['s]

331 n.

14

.•• vol-

untary actions are subject to the strictures of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as to the lirni tat ions of ••• Title VII."
No. 93 v. City of Cleveland,
(citing Weber, supra;
S. Ct. 1842 (1986))

106 S.

Ct.

3063,

3075 n. 8

Local
(1986)

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 106

(emphasis added).

Just last term, the Court

declined "to address the circumstances,

if any,

in which volun-

tary action by a public employer that is permissible under [Title
VII]

would

nonetheless be barred by the Fourteenth Amendment."

Ibid.
Justice O'Connor

proposes

that

there should be no dis-

tinction between the standards used to assess voluntary employer
action under Title VII or under the Equal Protection Clause.

She

recently stated:
The value of voluntary compliance is doubly important
when it is a public employer that acts, both because of
the example its voluntary assumption of responsibility
sets and because the remediation of governmental discrimination is of unique importance.
[It would be
an] anomalous result that what private employers may
voluntarily do to correct apparent violations of Title
VII, •.• Weber, public employers are • • • forbidden to
do to correct their statutory and constitutional transgressions.
Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1855.
as to what would

But note:

Justice O'Connor's theory

justify an affirmative action plan under the

Equal Protection Clause is stated in terms of Title VII principles:
[I]n order to provide some assurance of protection to
the interests of its nonminority employees and the employe~ itself in the event that its affirmative action
plan is challenged, the public employer must have a
firm basi
for determining that a frirmat ive act1on 1s
w~ .
Pu 1c emp o er
-not----w-rt nout re li a 61e
benchmarks in making this determination.
For example,
demonstrable evidence of a disparity between the percentage of qualified blacks on a school's teaching
staff and the percentage of qualified minorities in the
relevant labor pool sufficient to support a prima facie
Title~rn or
ractice c a1m y m1nor1ty eachers o
en a compel 1ng
's for a competent authority such a the School Board to conclude that implementation of a voluntary affirmative action plan is
appropriate to remedy apparent prior employment discrimination.
·
Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1856 (emphasis added).
nnor would find a
an

~tguable

Thus, Justice O'Co-

~ tatistical imbalance~fici~~o

Title VII violation to b

suf=;'tci~:;

to

demonstrate

jus~ify

an

affirmative action plan for either a public or private employer.
The Court in Weber specifically rejected this "arguable
violation" standard for a private employer under Title VII.
tice Blackmun concurred,

Jus-

stating the reasons why departure from

the "arguable violation" standard is justified in the Title VII
context.

Justice Blackmun noted two ways

in which the Court's

standard in Weber differed from the "arguable violation" standard.

First,

under Weber,

th~

individual employer need not have

engaged in discrimination in the past.

It is enough that there

be a manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category.

A job category is "traditionally segregated" when there has

been "a societal history of purposeful exclusion of
i ty]

from the job category,

[the minor-

resulting in a persistent disparity

7

between the proportion of

[the minority]

in the labor force and

the proportion of [the minority] among those who hold jobs within
the category."

443 U.S., at 212.

Second, "in assessing a prima

facie case of Title VII liability, the composition of the employer' s

work

force

is compared to the composition of the pool of

workers who meet valid job qualifications.
"job category"

is

Hazelwood . . • . When a

traditionally segregated,

however,

that pool

will reflect the effects of segregation, and the Court's approach
goes further

and permits as comparison with the composition of

the labor force as a whole, in which minorities are more heavily
represented."

Id., at 214.

Justice O'Connor perceives both of these departures from
~e

"arguable violation" standard to be reflected in the Johnson

opinion and seeks to have them altered to comport with the "arguable violation" standard.

On the second point, Justice Brennan's

clerk informs me that he would be willing to change the Johnson
opinion to state that the adoption of an affirmative action plan
must be based on a comparison of the employer's work force with
the qualified work force.

This is a very important concession.

Requiring an employer to focus on the disparity between his work
force and the qualified work force is an important guarantee that
~e

plan will not "unnecessarily trammel" the rights of nonminor-

i ty employees.

It also makes the

crimination more compelling,

inference of prior past dis-

since any disparity would indicate

that the employer had failed to hire a significant percentage of
available minority individuals.

This leaves as the only point of diseute between Justice
--~_;~----------~~~

O'Connor and Justice Brennan whether a voluntary affirmative action

plan must

enough

justified by a

to support a

claim by

standard

On

this point,

the

two sides appear

Justice O'Connor believes that the prima facie case
is

employees.

necessary

to

protect

Justice Brennan

joined the opinion)

would

statistical disparity strong

prima facie Title VII pattern or practice

the minorities.

immovable.

have

be

act as

(and

the
the

interests of
other

nonminority

three Justices

believe that the prima facie

who

standard

ll

•

too great of a deterrent to private employers 1;.9

adopt an affirmative action plan.

The argument is that Congress

mtended to preserve employer prerogatives to the greatest extent
possible in Title VII.

Private employers are very sensitive to

the threat of Title VII liability, and would be very unwilling to
admit,

even

to

justify

an

affirmative

might have discriminated in the past.

action

plan,

that

they

Very strong statistics are

required alone to establish a prima facie case,

thus employers

would often have to supply additional evidence of past discrimination to justify adoption of a plan.
from adopting

a

plan

This would deter employers

-

in the first plan and thus

goal of voluntary compliance with Title VII.

frustrate

the

The question is not

----~~-----------------------------whether
Title VII authorizes the plan; only whether the statute
affirmatively prohibits it.

Thus,

it is appropriate to preserve

management prerogatives voluntarily to effectuate the purposes of
the Act by allowing employers to adopt plans when they can show a
"manifest

imbalance

in a

traditionally segregated work

force."

Moreover, Weber has already crossed this bridge by way of statu-

tory interpretation and so the Court should not now interpret the
~-

'

prohibitions of Title VII more strictly.
This is a very close question.

Both Justice O'Connor's

view and Justice Brennan's view have points in their favor.

On

balance, it seems better to retain distinct standards of analysis
tnder Title VII and
with

the Court's

the Constitution.

treatment of

This view is consistent

the standards

for

violations in

Title VII and equal protection cases not involving affirmative
action plans.

This Court has never stated that the standards for

determining a Title VII violation and an Equal Protection violaIn fact,

tion are the same.

cally different standards.
411

u.~73),

the Court has articulated specifi-

In McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green,
the Court noted, "The language of Title

VII makes plain the purpose of Congress
employment opportunities

and

to

to assure equality of

eliminate

those discriminatory

practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments

to

the

disadvantage

of

minority

citizens."

The

Court then articulated the order and burden of proof in a Title
VII case.

Under Title VII, an employer is only required to ar-

ticulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
discrimination.
quired

to

In equal protection cases,

justify

apparent

discrimination

justification and demonstrate
lored'

to achieve the end.

posed

a

stricter

under Title VII.

burden

the

the apparent

an employer is rewith

a

"compelling"

the means are "narrowly tai-

Thus, the Court has consistently imof

proof

under

the Constitution than

-

It

appears

proof when

to make sense

evaluating

affirmative

to adopt

this distinction in

action plans

as

well.

Just

because the Constitution stands as an independent limitation on
public employers

does

not mean

that

that

limitation should

be

imposed on private employers as well for the sake of consistency.
Private employers may well be more sensitive to economic concerns
than public employers and

thus more deterred

justification standard

an

for

affirmative

by a prima facie

action plan.

It

is

important to emphasize also that the prima facie standard and the
"manifest

imbalance"

standard

are

not

really

that

far

apart.

"Manifest imbalance" seems to contemplate something less than a
prima

facie

case.

But,

the decision in this case rests on an
--··-----

imbalance of 238:0.

Approval of this manifest imbalance will not

encourage

lightly to adopt

employers

affirmative action plans.

Moreover, the manifest imbalance must be evident in a "traditionally

segregated

job category."

"Traditionally segregated"

im-

plicitly means a job category where past discrimination has occurred.

The only difference between this standard and the prima

facie case standard is thus the link between the discrimination
and the particular employer.
affirmative

action

Arguably, an employer could base an

plan on a

manifest

imbalance

that

reflects

romeone else's discrimination -- either the union or society in
general.

But the potential for an employer basing an affirmative

action plan on general societal discrimination is greatly reduced
by the requirement that any disparity be based on the qualified
work

force.

The

fact

that

an employer

has

a manifestly fewer

minority members than the qualified work force is highly proba-

tive of his own discrimination and looks very much like a prima
facie case.
There are a number of possible methods of action at this
point.

You could write a note to Justice Brennan indicating the

changes that you would

like

to see.

First,
______,

he should clarify

that the adoption of an affirmative action plan as well as its
mplementation should be based on a comparison of the employer's
work force with the qualified work force at large.
may want

to ask

him to make clearer

in

footnote

Second, you
2 that,

even

though the Court does not reach the issue in this case, a public
employer such as the Transportation Agency is also subject to the
distinct
Wygant.
renee.

prohibitions

of

Another option

is

the

Equal

Protection

Clause.

See

to await Justice O'Connor's concur-

Her clerk is very busy and does not expect to start writ-

ing until later next week, so it may be a while before the concurrence circulates.
nnor

Given your position between Justice O'Co-

and Justice Brennan,

it does not appear wise

write before Justice O'Connor does.

for

you to

The problem with waiting for

her concurrence is that Justice Brennan will not modify the qualified work force language until he receives a specific request.
If he received a request from you before Justice O'Connor writes,
the gap between them will not appear as wide and the disagreement
in the concurrence will be less pronounced.
nature of affirmative action opinions
appears desirable.

Given the fractured

in the past,

this result
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.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,..JR.

December 5, 1986
Re: 85-1129 - Johnson v. Transportation Agency
Dear Bill:
I agree in large part with your exceptionally well
written opinion in this Title VII case.
I do share Sandra's
concern that the opinion make clearer that the adoption of a
voluntary affirmative action plan, as well as its implementation, should be based upon a reasonable comparison of the
percentage of the protected group within the employer's work
force with the percentage of qualified members of the protected class in the work force at large.
I would appreciate your considering a paragraph along the following lines
that could be added prior to the first full paragraph on
page 10:
Our decisions have made clear the method
by which a ftmanifest imbalanceft should be
ascertained in order to justify the adoption
of a voluntary affirmative action plan. A
comparison of the percentage of minorities or
women in the employer's work force with the
percentage in the labor market -- or in some
circumstances even in the general population
-- may be appropriate to determine conspicuous underrepresentation in jobs that require
no specialized training or experience.
See
Weber, supra (comparison between proportion
of blacks working at plant and proportion of
blacks in area labor force appropriate in
calculating imbalance for purposes of establishing craft training program): Teamsters
v. United States, 431 u.s. 324 (1977) (comparison between percentage of blacks in employer's work force and in area general population proper in determining extent of imbalance in truck driving positions). Where a
job requires special expertise, however, the
comparison should be with those in the labor
force who possess the relevant qualifications.
See Hazelwood School District v.
United States, 433 u.s. 299 (1977) (must compare percentage of blacks in employer's work
ranks with percentage of qualified black

2.
teachers in area labor force in determining
underrepresentation in teaching positions).
The requirement that the "manifest imbalance"
relate to a "traditionally segregated job
category" provides an additional assurance
that the adoption of a voluntary affirmative
action plan is based upon a bona fide remedial objective consistent with the purposes of
Title VII.
As you will notice, this paragraph consists largely of
two sentences from the middle of the paragraph in your opinion beginning at the bottom of page 12 and ending on page
13.
It appears that these two sentences can be removed from
this paragraph without disrupting the flow of the argument.
I have attached a copy of your opinion indicating these proposed changes as well as a few other minor additions.
My only additional suggestion is that a sentence along
the following lines be added to footnote 2:
"Of course
where the issue is properly raised, public employers must
justify the adoption and implementation o f a voluntary a f firmative action plan under the Equal Protection Clause.
See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
u.s.
(1986)."
If you prefer not to make these changes I will of
course understand.
I will join your judgment in any event,
and will say in whatever I write that I agree for the most
part with your opinion.

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice White
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1129
PAUL E. JOHNSON, PETITIONER v. TRANSPORTATION AGENCY, SANTA CLARA COUNTY,
CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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[December - , 1986)

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, Transportation Agency of Santa Clara
County, California, unilaterally promulgated an Affirmative
Action Plan applicable, inter alia, to promotions of employees. In selecting applicants for the promotional position of
road dispatcher, the Agency, pursuant to the Plan, passed
over petitioner Paul Johnson, a male employee, and promoted a female employee applicant, Diane Joyce. The question for decision is whether in making the promotion the
Agency impermissibly took into account the sex of the applicants in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 1 The District Court for the
Northern District of California, in an action filed by peti• Section 703(a) of the Act, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 86 Stat. 109, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a), provides that it "shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual .-ith respect to his compensation,
tenns, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
"(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would depri"e or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or othenrise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
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tioner following receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), held
that respondent had violated Title VII. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 1a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 748 F. 2d 1308 (1984); modified, 770 F. 2d 752
(1985). We granted certiorari, 478 U. S . - (1986). We
affirm. 2
I
A
In December 1978, the Santa Clara County Transit District
Board of Supervisors adopted an Affirmative Action Plan
(Plan) for the County Transportation Agency. The Plan implemented a County Affirmative Action Plan, which had been
adopted, declared the County, because "mere prohibition of
discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the effects
of past practices and to permit attainment of an equitable
representation of minorities, women and handicapped persons." App. 31. 3 Relevant to this case, the Agency Plan
provides that, in making promotions to positions within a traditionally segregated job classification in which women have
been significantly underrepresented, the Agency is authorized to consider as one factor the sex of a qualified applicant.
In reviewing the composition of its work force, the Agency
noted in its Plan that women were represented in numbers
far less than their proportion of the county labor force in both
the Agency as a whole and in five of seven job categories.
t No constitutional issue was either raised or addressed in the litigation
below. See 748 F. 2d 1308, 1310, n. 1 (1984). We therefore decide in this
case only the issue of the prohibitory scope of Title VII. Of course, where [ ·
the issue is properly raised, public employers must justify the adaption and
implementation of a voluntary affirmative action plan under the Equal Protection Clause. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,- U.S.
-(1986).
• The Plan reaffirmed earlier County and Agency efforts to address the
issue of employment discrimination, dating back to the County's adoption
in 1971 of an Equal Employment Opportunity Policy. App. 37-40.

85-1129-0PINION
JOHNSON v. TRANSPORTATION AGENCY

3

Specifically, while women constituted 36.4% of the area labor
market, they composed only 22.4% of Agency employees.
Furthermore, women working at the Agency were concentrated largely in EEOC job categories traditionally held by
women: women made up 76% of Office and Clerical Workers,
but only 7.1% of Agency Officials and Administrators, 8.6%
of Professionals, 9. 7% of Technicians, and 22% of Service and
Maintenance workers. As for the job classification relevant
to this case, none of the 238 Skilled Craft Worker positions
was held by a woman. !d., at 49. The Plan noted that this
underrepresentation of women in part reflected the fact that
women had not traditionally been employed in these positions, and that they had not been strongly motivated to seek
training or employment in them "because of the limited
opportunities that have existed in the past for them to work
in such classifications." !d., at 57. The Plan also observed
that, while the proportion of ethnic minorities in the Agency
as a whole exceeded the proportion of such minorities in the
county work force, a smaller percentage of minority employees held management, professional, and technical positions. 4
The Agency stated that its Plan was intended to achieve "a
statistically measurable yearly improvement in hiring, training and promotion of minorities and women throughout the
Agency in all major job classifications where they are underrepresented." I d., at 43. As a benchmark by which to evaluate progress, the Agency stated that its long-term goal was
to attain a work force whose composition reflected the proportion of minorities and women in the area labor force. I d.,
at 54. Thus, for the Skilled Craft category in which the road
dispatcher position at issue here was classified, the Agency's
aspiration was that eventually about 36% of the jobs would be
occupied by women.
• While minorities constituted 19.7% of the county labor force, they represented 7.1% of the Agency's Officials and Administrators, 19% of its Professionals, and 16.9% of its Technicians. /d., at 48.

'\
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The Plan acknowledged that a number of factors might
make it unrealistic to rely on the Agency's long-term goals in
evaluating the Agency's progress in expanding job opportunities for minorities and women. Among the factors identified
were low turnover rates in some classifications, the fact that
some jobs involved heavy labor, the small number of positions within some job categories, the limited number of entry
positions leading to the Technical and Skilled Craft classifications, and the limited number of minorities and women qualified for positions requiring specialized training and experience. !d., at 56-57. As a result, the Plan counselled that
short-range goals be established and annually adjusted to
serve as the most realistic guide for actual employment decisions. Among the tasks identified as important in establishing such short-term goals was the acquisition of data ''reflecting the ratio of minorities, women and handicapped persons
who are working in the local area in major job classifications
relating to those utilized by the County Administration," so
as to determine the availability of members of such groups
who "possess the desired qualifications or potential for placement." !d., at 64. These data on qualified group members,
along with predictions of position vacancies, were to serve as
the basis for "realistic yearly employment goals for women,
minorities and handicapped persons in each EEOC job category and major job classification." Ibid.
The Agency's Plan thus set aside no specific number of positions for minorities or women, but authorized the consideration of ethnicity or sex as a factor when evaluating qualified
candidates for jobs in which members of such groups were
poorly represented. One such job was the road dispatcher
position that is the subject of the dispute in this case.
B

On December 12, 1979, the Agency announced a vacancy
for the promotional position of road dispatcher in the Agency's Roads Division. Dispatchers assign road crews, equip-
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ment, and materials, and maintain records pertaining to road
maintenance jobs. I d., at 23-24. The position requires at
minimum four years of dispatch or road maintenance work
experience for Santa Clara County. The EEOC job classification scheme designates a road dispatcher as a Skilled Craft
worker.
Twelve County employees applied for the promotion, including Joyce and Johnson. Joyce had worked for the
County since 1970, serving as an account clerk until 1975.
She had applied for a road dispatcher position in 1974, but
was deemed ineligible because she had not served as a road
maintenance worker. In 1975, Joyce transferred from a senior account clerk position to a road maintenance worker position, becoming the first woman to fill such a job. Tr.
83-84. During her four years in that position, she occasionally worked out of class as a road dispatcher.
Petitioner Johnson began with the county in 1967 as a road
yard clerk, after private employment that included working
as a supervisor and dispatcher. He had also unsuccessfully
applied for the road dispatcher opening in 1974. In 1977, his
clerical position was downgraded, and he sought and received
a transfer to the position of road maintenance worker. !d.,
at 127. He also occasionally worked out of class as a dispatcher while performing that job.
Nine of the applicants, including Joyce and Johnson, were
deemed qualified for the job, and were interviewed by a twoperson board. Seven of the applicants scored above 70 on
this interview, which meant that they were certified as eligible for selection by the appointing authority. The scores
awarded ranged from 70 to 80. Johnson was tied for second
with score of 75, while Joyce ranked next with a score of 73.
A second interview was conducted by three Agency supervisors, who ultimately recommended that Johnson be promoted. Prior to the second interview, Joyce had contacted
the County's Affirmative Action Office because she feared
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that her application might not receive disinterested review. 5
The Office in turn contacted the Agency's Affirmative Action
Coordinator, whom the Agency's Plan makes responsible for,
inter alia, keeping the Director informed of opportunities for
the Agency to accomplish its objectives under the Plan. At
the time, the Agency employed no women in any Skilled
Craft position, and had never employed a woman as a road
dispatcher. The Coordinator recommended to the Director
of the Agency, James Graebner, that Joyce be promoted.
Graebner, authorized to choose any of the seven persons
deemed eligible, thus had the benefit of suggestions by the
second interview panel and by the Agency Coordinator in arriving at his decision. Mter deliberation, Graebner concluded that the promotion should be given to Joyce. As he
testified: "I tried to look at the whole picture, the combination of her qualifications and Mr. Johnson's qualifications,
their test scores, their expertise, their background, affirma& Joyce testified that she had had disagreements \\;th two of the three
members of the second interview panel. One had been her first supervisor
when she began work as a road maintenance worker. In performing arduous work in this job, she had not been issued coveralls, although her male
co-workers had received them. After ruining her pants, she complained
to her supervisor, to no avail. After three other similar incidents, ruining
clothes on each occasion, she filed a grievance, and was issued four pair of
coveralls the next day. Tr. 89-90. Joyce had dealt with a second member
of the panel for a year and a half in her capacity as chair of the Roads Operations Safety Committee, where she and he "had several differences of
opinion on how safety should be implemented." /d., at 90-91. In addition, Joyce testified that she had infonned the person responsible for arranging her second interview that she had a disaster preparedness class on
a certain day the following week. By this time about ten days had passed
since she had notified this person of her availability, and no date had yet
been set for the interview. Within a day or two after this conversation,
however, she received a notice setting her interview at a time directly in
the middle of her disaster preparedness class. /d., at 94-95. This same \
panel member had earlier described Joyce as a "rebel-rousing, skirt-wearing person," Tr. 153.
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tive action matters, things like that ... I believe it was a
combination of all those." I d., at 68.
The certification form naming Joyce as the person promoted to the dispatcher position stated that both she and
Johnson were rated as well-qualified for the job. The evaluation of Joyce read: "Well qualified by virtue of 18 years of
past clerical experience including 3Y2 years at West Yard plus
almost 5 years as a [road maintenance worker]." App. 27.
The evaluation of Johnson was as follows: 'Well qualified applicant; two years of [road maintenance worker] experience
plus 11 years of Road Yard Clerk. Has had previous outside
Dispatch experience but was 13 years ago." Ibid.
Graebner testified that he did not regard as significant the
fact that Johnson scored 75 and Joyce 73 when interviewed
by the two-person board. Tr. 57-58.
Petitioner Johnson filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that he had been denied promotion on the basis of sex in
violation of Title VII. He received a right-to-sue letter from
the agency on March 10, 1981, and on March 20, 1981, filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The District Court found that Johnson
was more qualified for the dispatcher position than Joyce,
and that the sex of Joyce was the "determining factor in her
selection." App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a (emphasis in original).
The court acknowledged that, since the Agency justified its
decision on the basis of its Affirmative Action Plan, the criteria announced in Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979),
should be applied. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a. It then found
the Agency's Plan invalid on the ground that the evidence did
not satisfy Weber's criterion that the Plan be temporary.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the absence of an express termination date in the Plan was not dispositive, since
the Plan repeatedly expressed its objective as the attainment, rather than the maintenance, of a work force mirroring
the labor force in the county. 748 F. 2d, at 1312, modified,
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770 F. 2d 752 (1985). The Court of Appeals added that the
fact that the Plan established no fixed percentage of positions
for minorities or women made it less essential that the Plan
contain a relatively explicit deadline. 748 F. 2d, at 1312.
The Court held further that the Agency's consideration of
Joyce's sex in filling the road dispatcher position was lawful.
The Agency Plan had been adopted, the court said, to address a conspicuous imbalance in the Agency's work force,
and neither unnecessarily trammeled the rights of other employees, nor created an absolute bar to their advancement.
/d., at 1313-1314.
II

As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner bears the
burden of establishing the invalidity of the Agency's Plan.
Only last term in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
476 U. S. - - , - (1986), we held that "[t]he ultimate burden remains with the employees to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program," and we see
no basis for a different rule regarding a plan's alleged violation of Title VII. This case also fits readily within the analytical framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). Once a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case that race or sex has been taken into account
in an employer's employment decision, the burden shifts to
the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for
its decision. The existence of an affirmative action plan provides such a rationale. If such a plan is articulated as the
basis for the employer's decision, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to prove that the plan is invalid and the employer's
justification is pretextual. As a practical matter, of course,
an employer will generally seek to avoid a charge of pretext
by presenting evidence in support of its plan. That does not
mean, however, as petitioner suggests, that reliance on an affirmative action plan is to be treated as an affirmative defense requiring the employer to carry the burden of proving
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the validity of the plan. The burden of proving its invalidity
remains on the plaintiff.
The assessment of the legality of the Agency Plan must be
guided by our decision in Weber, supra. In that case, the
Court addressed the question whether the employer violated
Title VII by adopting a voluntary affirmative action plan designed to "eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories." Id., at 197. The respondent employee in that case challenged the employer's denial of
his application for a position in a newly established craft
training program, contending that the employer's selection
process impermissibly took into account the race of the applicants. The selection process was guided by an affirmative
action plan, which provided that 50% of the new trainees
were to be black until the percentage of black skilled
craftworkers in the employer's plant approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. Adoption of the
plan had been prompted by the fact that only 5 of 273, or
1.83%, of skilled craftworkers at the plant were black, even
though the work force in the area was approximately 39%
black. Because of the historical exclusion of blacks from
craft positions, the employer regarded its former policy of
hiring trained outsiders as inadequate to redress the imbalance in its work force.
We upheld the employer's decision to select less senior
black applicants over the white respondent, for we found that
taking race into account was consistent with Title VII's objective of "break[ing] down old patterns of racial segregation
and hierarchy." I d., at 208. We noted that the plan did not
"unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees," since it did not require "the discharge of white workers
and their replacement with new black hirees." Ibid. Nor
did the plan create "an absolute bar to the advancement of
white employees," since half of those trained in the new program were to be white. Ibid. Finally, we observed that
the plan was a temporary measure, not designed to maintain

85-1129-0PINION
10

JOHNSON v. TRANSPORTATION AGENCY

racial balance, but to "eliminate a manifest racial imbalance."
Ibid. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence made clear,
Weber held that an employer seeking to justify the adoption
of a plan need not point to its own prior discriminatory practices, nor even to evidence of an "arguable violation" on its
part. I d., at 212. Rather, it need point only to a "conspicuous . . . imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." I d., at 209. Our decision was grounded on the recognition that voluntary employer action can play a crucial role
in furthering Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of
discrimination in the workplace, and that Title VII should not
be read to thwart such efforts. I d., at 204.
In reviewing the employment decision at issue in this case,
we must first examine whether that decision was made pursuant to a plan prompted by concerns similar to those of the
employer in Weber. Next, we must determine whether the
effect of the plan on males and non-minorities is comparable
to the effect of the plan in that case. The first issue is therefore whether consideration of the sex of applicants for skilled
craft jobs was justified by the existence of a "manifest imbalance" that reflected underrepresentation of women in "traditionally segregated job categories." Id., at 197. In determining whether an imbalance exists that would justify taking
sex or race into account, a comparison of the percentage of
minorities or women in the employer's work force with the
percentage in the area labor market or general population is
appropriate in analyzing jobs that require no special expertise, see Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977)
(comparison between percentage of blacks in employer's
work force and in general population proper in determining
extent of imbalance in truck driving positions), or training
programs designed to provide expertise, see Weber, supra
(comparison between proportion of blacks working at plant
and proportion of blacks in area labor force appropriate in calculating imbalance for purpose of establishing preferential
admission to craft training program). Where a job requires
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special training, however, the comparison should be with
those in the labor force who possess the relevant qualifications. See Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433
U. S. 299 (1977) (must compare percentage of blacks in employer's work ranks with percentage of qualified black teachers in area labor force in determining underrepresentation in
teaching positions). The requirement that the "manifest imbalance" relate to a "traditionally segregated job category"
provides assurance that sex or race will be taken into account
in a manner consistent with Title VII's purpose of eliminating
the effects of employment discrimination.
It is clear that the decision to hire Joyce was made pursuant to an Agency plan that directed that sex or race by taken
into account for the purpose of remedying this type of underrepresentation. The Agency Plan acknowledged the "limited opportunities that have existed in the past," App. 57, for
women to find employment in certain job classifications
"where women have not been traditionally employed in significant numbers." ld., at 51. 6 As a result, observed the
Plan, women were concentrated in traditionally female jobs
in the Agency, and represented a lower percentage in other
job classifications than would be expected if such traditional
segregation had not occurred. Specifically, 9 of the 10 ParaProfessionals and 110 of the 145 Office and Clerical Workers
'For instance, the description of the Skilled Craft Worker category, in
which the road dispatcher position is located, is as follows:
"Occupations in which workers perfonn jobs which require special manual skill and a thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the process involved in the work which is acquired through on-the-job training and experience or through apprenticeship or other fonnal training programs.
Includes: mechanics and repairmen; electricians, heavy equipment operators, stationary engineers, skilled machining occupations, carpenters,
compositors and typesetters and kindred workers." App. 108.
~the Court of Appeals said in its decision below, "A plethora of proof is
hardly necessary to show that women are generally underrepresented in
such positions and that strong social pressures weigh against their participation." 748 F. 2d, at 1313.
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were women. By contrast, women were only 2 of the 28 Officials and Administrators, 5 of the 58 Professionals, 12 of the
124 Technicians, none of the Skilled Craft Workers, and 1who was Joyc~f the 110 Road Maintenance Workers.
Id., at 51-52. The Plan sought to remedy these imbalances
through "hiring, training and promotion of ... women
throughout the Agency in all major job classifications where
they are underrepresented." I d., at 43.
As an initial matter, the Agency adopted as a benchmark
for measuring progress in eliminating underrepresentation
the long-term goal of a work force that mirrored in its major
job classifications the percentage of women in the area labor
market. 7 Even as it did so, however, the Agency acknowl- (
edged that such a figure could not itself necessarily justify
taking into account the sex of applicants for positions in all .
job categories. For positions requiring specialized training
and experience, the Plan observed that the number of minorities and women "who possess the qualifications required for
entry into such job classifications is limited." I d., at 56.
The Plan therefore directed that annual short-term goals be
formulated that would provide a more realistic indication of
the degree to which sex should be taken into account in filling
particular positions. I d., at 61-64. The Plan stressed that
such goals "should not be construed as 'quotas' that must be
met," but as reasonable aspirations in correcting the imbalance in the Agency's work force. /d., at 64. These goals
were to take into account factors such as "turnover, layoffs,
lateral transfers, new job openings, retirements and availability of minorities, women and handicapped persons in the
area work force who possess the desired qualifications or potential for placement." Ibid. The Plan specifically directed
that, in establishing such goals, the Agency work with the
1

Because of the employment decision at issue in this case, our discussion henceforth refers primarily to the Plan's provisions to remedy the underrepresentation of women. Our analysis could apply as well, however,
to the provisions of the plan pertaining to minorities.
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County Planning Department and other sources in attempting to compile data on the percentage of minorities and
women in the local labor force that were actually working in
the job classifications comprising the Agency work force.
I d., at 63-64. From the outset, therefore, the Plan sought
annually to develop even more refined measures of the underrepresentation in each job category that required
attention.
As the Agency Plan recognized, women were most egregiously underrepresented in the Skilled Craft job category,
since none of the 238 positions was occupied by a woman. In
mid-1980, when Joyce was selected for the road dispatcher
position, the Agency was still in the process of refining its
short-term goals for Skilled Craft Workers in accordance
with the directive of the Plan. This process did not reach
fruition until1982, when the Agency established a short-term
goal for that year of three women for the 55 expected openings in that job category-a modest goal of about 6% for that
category.
We reject petitioner's argument that, since only the longterm goal was in place for Skilled Craft positions at the time
of Joyce's promotion, it was inappropriate for the Director to
take into account affirmative action considerations in filling
the road dispatcher position. The Agency's Plan emphasized
that the long-term goals were not to be taken as guides for
actual hiring decisions, but that supervisors were to consider
a host of practical factors in seeking to meet affirmative action objectives, including the fact that in some job categories
women were not qualified in numbers comparable to their
representation in the labor force.
By contrast, had the Plan simply calculated imbalances in
all categories according to the proportion of women in the
area labor pool, and then directed that hiring be governed
solely by those figures, its validity fairly could be called into
question. This is because analysis of a more specialized
labor pool normally is necessary in determining underrepre-
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sentation in some positions. If a plan failed to take distinctions in qualifications into account in providing guidance for
actual employment decisions, it would dictate mere blind hiring by the numbers, for it would hold supervisors to "achievement of a particular percentage of minority employment or
membership . . . regardless of circumstances such as economic conditions or the number of qualified minority applicants ... " Sheet Metal Workers' v. EEOC, 478 U. S. - (1986) (JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
The Agency's Plan emphatically did not authorize such
blind hiring. It expressly directed that numerous factors be
taken into account in making hiring decisions, including specifically the qualifications of female applicants for particular
jobs. Thus, despite the fact that no precise short-term goal
was yet in place for the Skilled Craft category in mid-1980,
the Agency's management nevertheless had been clearly instructed that they were not to hire solely by reference to statistics. The fact that only the long-term goal had been established for this category posed no danger that personnel
decisions would be made by reflexive adherence to a numerical standard.
Furthermore, in considering the candidates for the road
dispatcher position in 1980, the Agency hardly needed to rely
on a refined short-term goal to realize that it had a significant
problem of underrepresentation that required attention.
Given the obvious imbalance in the Skilled Craft category,
and given the Agency's commitment to eliminating such imbalances, it was plainly not unreasonable for the Agency to
determine that it was appropriate to consider as one factor
the sex of Ms. Joyce in making its decision. 8 The promotion
• In addition, the Agency was mindful of the importance of finally hiring
a woman in a job category that had fonnerly been all-male. The Director
testified that, while the promotion of Joyce "made a small dent, for sure, in
the numbers," nonetheless "philosophically it made a larger impact in that
it probably has encouraged other females and minorities to look at the pos-
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of Joyce thus satisfies the first requirement enunciated in
Weber, since it was undertaken to further an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate Agency work force imbalances
in traditionally segregated job categories.
We next consider whether the Agency Plan unnecessarily
trammeled the rights of male employees or created an absolute bar to their advancement. In contrast to the plan in Weber, which provided that 50% of the positions in the craft
training program were exclusively for blacks, and to the consent decree upheld last term in Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478
U. S. - - (1986), which required the promotion of specific
numbers of minorities, the Plan sets aside no positions for
women. The Plan expressly states that "[t]he 'goals' established for each· Division should not be construed as 'quotas'
that must be met." App. 64. Rather, the Plan merely authorizes that consideration be given to affirmative action concerns when evaluating qualified applicants. As the Agency
Director testified, the sex of Joyce was but one of numerous
factors he took into acount in arriving at his decision. Tr.
68.
The Plan thus resembles the "Harvard Plan" approvingly noted by JUSTICE POWELL in University of California
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 316-319 (1978), which considers race along with other criteria in determining admission
to the college. As JUSTICE PowELL observed, "In such an
admissions program, race or ethnic background may be
deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not
insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats." !d., at 317. Similarly, the
Agency Plan requires women to compete with all other qualified applicants. No persons are automatically excluded from
consideration; all are able to have their qualifications
weighed against those of other applicants.
In addition, petitioner had no absolute entitlement to the
road dispatcher position. Seven of the applicants were classibility of so-called 'non-traditional' jobs as areas where they and the
agency both have samples of a success story." Tr. 64.
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sified as qualified and eligible, and the Agency Director was
authorized to promote any of the seven. Thus, denial of the
promotion unsettled no legitimate firmly rooted expectation
on the part of the petitioner. Furthermore, while the petitioner in this case was denied a promotion, he retained his
employment with the Agency, at the same salary and with
the same seniority, and remained eligible for other
promotions. 9
Finally, the Agency's Plan was intended to attain a balanced work force, not to maintain one. The Plan contains
ten references to the Agency's desire to "attain" such a balance, but no reference whatsoever to a goal of maintaining it.
The Director testified that, while the "broader goal" of affirmative action, defined as "the desire to hire, to promote, to
give opportunity and training on an equitable, non-discriminatory basis," is something that is "a permanent part" of "the
Agency's operating philosophy," that broader goal "is divorced, if you will, from specific numbers or percentages."
Tr. 48-49.
The Agency acknowledged the difficulties that it would
confront in remedying the imbalance in its work force, and
anticipated only gradual increases in the representation of
minorities and women. 10 It is thus unsurprising that the
• Furthennore, from 1978 to 1982 Skilled Craft jobs in the Agency increased from 238 to 349. The Agency's personnel figures indicate that the
Agency fully expected most of these positions to be filled by men. Of the
111 new Skilled Craft jobs during this period, 105, or almost 951l, went to
men. As previously noted, the Agency's 1982 Plan set a goal of hiring only
three women out of the 55 new Skilled Craft positions projected for that
year, a figure of about 6%. While this degree of employment expansion by
an employer is by no means essential to a plan's validity, it underscores the
fact that the Plan in this case in no way significantly restricts the employment prospects of such persons. Illustrative of this is the fact that an additional road dispatcher position was created in 1983, and petitioner was
awarded the job. Brief for Respondent Transportation Agency 36, n. 35.
10
As the Agency Plan stated, after noting the limited number of minorities and women qualified in certain categories, as well as other difficulties
in remedying underrepresentation:
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Plan contains no explicit end date, for the Agency's flexible,
case-by-case approach was not expected to yield success in a
brief period of time. Express assurance that a program is
only temporary may be necessary if the program actually
sets aside positions according to specific numbers. See,
e. g., Firefighters, supra, at-- (four-year duration for consent decree providing for promotion of particular number of
minorities); Weber, 443 U. S., at 199 (plan requiring that
blacks constitute 50% of new trainees in effect until percentage of employer work force equal to percentage in local labor
force). This is necessary both to minimize the effect of the
program on other employees, and to ensure that the plan's
goals "[are] not being used simply to achieve and maintain
... balance, but rather as a benchmark against which" the
employer may measure its progress in eliminating the
underrepresention of minorities and women. Sheet Metal
Workers, supra, at--. In this case, however, substantial
evidence shows that the Agency has sought to take a moderate, gradual approach to eliminating the imbalance in its
work force, one which establishes realistic guidance for employment decisions, and which visits minimal intrusion on the
legitimate expectations of other employees. Given this fact,
as well as the Agency's express commitment to "attain" a balanced work force, there is ample assurance that the Agency
does not seek to use its Plan to maintain a permanent racial
and sexual balance.
"As indicated by the above factOrs, it will be much easier to attain the
Agency's employment goals in some job categories than in others. It is
particularly evident that it will be extremely difficult to significantly increase the representation of women in technical and skilled craft job classifications where they have traditionally been greatly underrepresented.
Similarly, only gradual increases in the representation of women, minorities or handicapped persons in management and professional positions can
realistically be expected due to the low turnover that exists in these positions and the small numbers of persons who can be expected to compete for
available openings." App. 58.
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In evaluating the compliance of an affirmative action plan
with Title VII's prohibition on discrimination, we must be
mindful of "this Court's and Congress' consistent emphasis on
'the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the
law.'" Wygant, 476 U. S., at-- (JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Bakke,
supra, at 364). The Agency in the case before us has undertaken such a voluntary effort, and has done so in full recognition of both the difficulties and the potential for intrusion on \
males and non-minorities. The Agency has identified a conspicuous imbalance in job categories traditionally segregated
by race and sex. It has made clear from the outset, however, that employment decisions may not be justified solely
by reference to this imbalance, but must rest on a multitude
of practical, realistic factors. It has therefore committed itself to annual adjustment of goals so as to provide a reasonable guide for actual hiring and promotion decisions. The
Agency earmarks no positions for anyone; sex is but one of
several factors that may be taken into account in evaluating
qualified applicants for a position. As both the Plan's language and its maimer of operation attest, the Agency has no
intention of establishing a work force whose permanent composition is dictated by rigid numerical standards.
We therefore hold that the Agency appropriately took into
account as one factor the sex of Diane Joyce in determining
that she should be promoted to the road dispatcher position.
The decision to do so was made pursuant to an affirmative action plan that represents a moderate, flexible, case-by-case
approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women in the Agency's work force.
Such a plan is fully consistent with Title VII, for it embodies
the contribution that voluntary employer action can make in
eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1129

PAUL E. JOHNSON, PETITIONER v. TRANSPORTATION AGENCY, SANTA CLARA COUNTY,
CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[March -

, 1987]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, Transportation Agency of Santa Clara
County, California, unilaterally promulgated an Affirmative
Action Plan applicable, inter alia, to promotions of employees. In selecting applicants for the promotional position of
road dispatcher, the Agency, pursuant to the Plan, passed
over petitioner Paul Johnson, a male employee, and promoted a female employee applicant, Diane Joyce. The question for decision is whether in making the promotion the
Agency impermissibly took into account the sex of the applicants in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 1 The District Court for the
Northern District of California, in an action filed by peti' Section 703(a) of the Act, 78 Stat. 255, as amended , 86 Stat. 109, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a), provides that it "shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
"(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
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tioner following receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), held
that respondent had violated Title VII. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 1a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 748 F. 2d 1308 (1984); modified, 770 F. 2d 752
(1985). We granted certiorari, 478 U. S. - - (1986). We
affirm. 2
I
A
In December 1978, the Santa Clara County Transit District
Board of Supervisors adopted an Affirmative Action Plan
(Plan) for the County Transportation Agency. The Plan implemented a County Affirmative Action Plan, which had been
adopted, declared the County, because "mere prohibition of
discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the effects
of past practices and to permit attainment of an equitable
representation of minorities, women and handicapped persons." App. 31. 3 Relevant to this case, the Agency Plan
provides that, in making promotions to positions within a traditionally segregated job classification in which women have
been significantly underrepresented, the Agency is authorized to consider as one factor the sex of a qualified applicant.
In reviewing the composition of its work force, the Agency
noted in its Plan that women were represented in numbers
far less than their proportion of the county labor force in both
the Agency as a whole and in five of seven job categories.
2
No constitutional issue was either raised or addressed in the litigation
below. See 748 F. 2d 1308, 1310, n. 1 (1984). We therefore decide in this
case only the issue of the prohibitory scope of Title VII. Of course, where
the issue is properly raised, public employers must justify the adaption and
implementation of a voluntary affirmative action plan under the Equal Protection Clause. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, U. S.

-

(1986).
3

The Plan reaffirmed earlier County and Agency efforts to address the
issue of employment discrimination, dating back to the County's adoption
in 1971 of an Equal Employment Opportunity Policy. App. 37-40.
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Specifically, while women constituted 36.4% of the area labor
market, they composed only 22.4% of Agency employees.
Furthermore, women working at the Agency were concentrated largely in EEOC job categories traditionally held by
women: women made up 76% of Office and Clerical Workers,
but only 7.1% of Agency Officials and Administrators, 8.6%
of Professionals, 9. 7% of Technicians, and 22% of Service and
Maintenance workers. As for the job classification relevant
to this case, none of the 238 Skilled Craft Worker positions
was held by a woman. I d., at 49. The Plan noted that this
underrepresentation of women in part reflected the fact that
women had not traditionally been employed in these positions, and that they had not been strongly motivated to seek
training or employment in them "because of the limited
opportunities that have existed in the past for them to work
in such classifications." I d., at 57. The Plan also observed
that, while the proportion of ethnic minorities in the Agency
as a whole exceeded the proportion of such minorities in the
county work force, a smaller percentage of minority employees held management, professional, and technical positions. 4
The Agency stated that its Plan was intended to achieve "a
statistically measurable yearly improvement in hiring, training and promotion of minorities and women throughout the
Agency in all major job classifications where they are underrepresented." !d., at 43. As a benchmark by which to evaluate progress, the Agency stated that its long-term goal was
to attain a work force whose composition reflected the proportion of minorities and women in the area labor force. I d. ,
at 54. Thus, for the Skilled Craft category in which the road
dispatcher position at issue here was classified, the Agency's
aspiration was that eventually about 36% of the jobs would be
occupied by women.
• While minorities constituted 19.7% of the county labor force, they represented 7.1% of the Agency's Officials and Administrators, 19% of its Professionals, and 16.9% of its Technicians. /d ., at 48.
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The Plan acknowledged that a number of factors might
make it unrealistic to rely on the Agency's long-term goals in
evaluating the Agency's progress in expanding job opportunities for minorities and women. Among the factors identified
were low turnover rates in some classifications, the fact that
some jobs involved heavy labor, the small number of positions within some job categories, the limited number of entry
positions leading to the Technical and Skilled Craft classifications, and the limited number of minorities and women
qualified for positions requiring specialized training and experience. Id., at 56-57. As a result, the Plan counselled
that short-range goals be established and annually adjusted
to serve as the most realistic guide for actual employment
decisions. Among the tasks identified as important in establishing such· short-term goals was the acquisition of data
"reflecting the ratio of minorities, women and handicapped
persons who are working in the local area in major job classifications relating to those utilized by the County Administration," so as to determine the availability of members of such
groups who "possess the desired qualifications or potential
for placement." I d., at 64. These data on qualified group
members, along with predictions of position vacancies, were
to serve as the basis for "realistic yearly employment goals
for women, minorities and handicapped persons in each
EEOC job category and major job classification." Ibid.
The Agency's Plan thus set aside no specific number of positions for minorities or women, but authorized the consideration of ethnicity or sex as a factor when evaluating qualified
candidates for jobs in which members of such groups were
poorly represented. One such job was the road dispatcher
position that is the subject of the dispute in this case.
B

On December 12, 1979, the Agency announced a vacancy
for the promotional position of road dispatcher in the Agency's Roads Division. Dispatchers assign road crews, equip-

..
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ment, and materials, and maintain records pertaining to road
maintenance jobs. ld., at 23-24. The position requires at
minimum four years of dispatch or road maintenance work
experience for Santa Clara County. The EEOC job classification scheme designates a road dispatcher as a Skilled Craft
worker.
Twelve County employees applied for the promotion, including Joyce and Johnson. Joyce had worked for the
County since 1970, serving as an account clerk until 1975.
She had applied for a road dispatcher position in 1974, but
was deemed ineligible because she had not served as a road
maintenance worker. In 1975, Joyce transferred from a senior account clerk position to a road maintenance worker
position, becoming the first woman to fill such a job. Tr.
83-84. During her four years in that position, she occasionally worked out of class as a road dispatcher.
Petitioner Johnson began with the county in 1967 as a road
yard clerk, after private employment that included working
as a supervisor and dispatcher. He had also unsuccessfully
applied for the road dispatcher opening in 1974. In 1977, his
clerical position was downgraded, and he sought and received
a transfer to the position of road maintenance worker. !d.,
at 127. He also occasionally worked out of class as a dispatcher while performing that job.
Nine of the applicants, including Joyce and Johnson, were
deemed qualified for the job, and were interviewed by a twoperson board. Seven of the applicants scored above 70 on
this interview, which meant that they were certified as eligible for selection by the appointing authority. The scores
awarded ranged from 70 to 80. Johnson was tied for second
with score of 75, while Joyce ranked next with a score of 73.
A second interview was conducted by three Agency supervisors, who ultimately recommended that Johnson be promoted. Prior to the second interview, Joyce had contacted
the County's Affirmative Action Office because she feared

..
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that her application might not receive disinterested review. 5
The Office in turn contacted the Agency's Affirmative Action
Coordinator, whom the Agency's Plan makes responsible for,
inter alia, keeping the Director informed of opportunities for
the Agency to accomplish its objectives under the Plan. At
the time, the Agency employed no women in any Skilled
Craft position, and had never employed a woman as a road
dispatcher. The Coordinator recommended to the Director
of the Agency, James Graebner, that Joyce be promoted.
Graebner, authorized to choose any of the seven persons
deemed eligible, thus had the benefit of suggestions by the
second interview panel and by the Agency Coordinator in arriving at his decision. After deliberation, Graebner concluded that the promotion should be given to Joyce. As he
testified: "I tried to look at the whole picture, the combination of her qualifications and Mr. Johnson's qualifications,
their test scores, their expertise, their background, affirmaJoyce testified that she had had disagreements with two of the three
members of the second interview panel. One had been her first supervisor
when she began work as a road maintenance worker. In performing arduous work in this job, she had not been issued coveralls, although her male
co-workers had received them. After ruining her pants, she complained
to her supervisor, to no avail. After three other similar incidents, ruining
clothes on each occasion, she filed a grievance, and was issued four pair of
coveralls the next day. Tr. 89-90. Joyce had dealt with a second member
of the panel for a year and a half in her capacity as chair of the Roads Operations Safety Committee, where she and he "had several differences of
opinion on how safety should be implemented." ld. , at 90-91. In addition , Joyce testified that she had informed the person responsible for arranging her second interview that she had a disaster preparedness class on
a certain day the following week. By this time about ten days had passed
since she had notified this person of her availability, and no date had yet
been set for the interview. Within a day or two after this conversation,
however, she received a notice setting her interview at a time directly in
the middle of her disaster preparedness class. I d. , at 94-95. This same
panel member had earlier described Joyce as a "rebel-rousing, skirt-wearing person," Tr. 153.
6
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tive action matters, things like that ... I believe it was a
combination of all those." I d., at 68.
The certification form naming Joyce as the person promoted to the dispatcher position stated that both she and
Johnson were rated as well-qualified for the job. The evaluation of Joyce read: "Well qualified by virtue of 18 years of
past clerical experience including 3Yz years at West Yard plus
almost 5 years as a [road maintenance worker]." App. 27.
The evaluation of Johnson was as follows: "Well qualified applicant; two years of [road maintenance worker] experience
plus 11 years of Road Yard Clerk. Has had previous outside
Dispatch experience but was 13 years ago." Ibid . Graebner testified that he did not regard as significant the fact that
Johnson scored 75 and Joyce 73 when interviewed by the
two-person board. Tr. 57-58.
Petitioner Johnson filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that he had been denied promotion on the basis of sex in
violation of Title VII. He received a right-to-sue letter from
the agency on March 10, 1981, and on March 20, 1981, filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The District Court found that Johnson
was more qualified for the dispatcher position than Joyce,
and that the sex of Joyce was the "determining factor in her
selection." App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a (emphasis in original).
The court acknowledged that, since the Agency justified its
decision on the basis of its Affirmative Action Plan, the criteria announced in Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979),
should be applied. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a. It then found
the Agency's Plan invalid on the ground that the evidence did
not satisfy Weber's criterion that the Plan be temporary.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed , holding that the absence of an express termination date in the Plan was not dispositive, since
the Plan repeatedly expressed its objective as the attainment, rather than the maintenance, of a work force mirroring
the labor force in the county. 748 F. 2d, at 1312, modified,
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770 F. 2d 752 (1985). . The Court of Appeals added that the
fact that the Plan established no fixed percentage of positions
for minorities or women made it less essential that the Plan
contain a relatively explicit deadline. 748 F. 2d, at 1312.
The Court held further that the Agency's consideration of
Joyce's sex in filling the road dispatcher position was lawful.
The Agency Plan had been adopted, the court said, to address a conspicuous imbalance in the Agency's work force,
· and neither unnecessarily trammeled the rights of other employees, nor created an absolute bar to their advancement.
I d., at 1313-1314.
II
As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner bears the
burden of establishing the invalidity of the Agency's Plan.
Only last term in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
476 U. S. - , - (1986), we held that "[t]he ultimate burden remains with the employees to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program," and we see
no basis for a different rule regarding a plan's alleged violation of Title VII. This case also fits readily within the analytical framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). Once a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case that race or sex has been taken into account
in an employer's employment decision, the burden shifts to
the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for
its decision. The existence of an affirmative action plan provides such a rationale. If such a plan is articulated as the
basis for the employer's decision, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to prove that the plan is invalid and the employer's
justification is pretextual. As a practical matter, of course,
an employer will generally seek to avoid a charge of pretext
by presenting evidence in support of its plan. That does not
mean, however, as petitioner suggests, that reliance on an affirmative action plan is to be treated as an affirmative defense requiring the employer to carry the burden of proving
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the validity of the plan. The burden of proving its invalidity
remains on the plaintiff.
The assessment of the legality of the Agency Plan must be
guided by our decision in Weber, supra. 6 In that case, the
Court addressed the question whether the employer violated
Title VII by adopting a voluntary affirmative action plan designed to "eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories." !d., at 197. The respondent employee in that case challenged the employer's denial of
his application for a position in a newly established craft
training program, contending that the employer's selection
process impermissibly took into account the race of the applicants. The selection process was guided by an affirmative
6
The dissent maintains that the obligations of a public employer under
Title VII must be identical to its obligations under the Constitution, and
that a public employer's adoption of an affirmative action plan therefore
should be governed by Wygant. This rests on the following logic: Title VI
embodies the same constraints as the Constitution; Title VI and Title VII
have the same prohibitory scope; therefore, Title VII and the Constitution
are coterminous for purposes of this case. The flaw is with the second
step of the analysis, for it advances a proposition that we explicitly considered and rejected in Weber. As we noted in that case, Title VI was an
exercise of federal power "over a matter in which the Federal Government
was already directly involved," since Congress "was legislating to assure
federal funds would not be used in an improper manner." 443 U. S., at
206 n. 6. "Title VII, by contrast, was enacted pursuant to the commerce
power to regulate purely private decisionmaking and was not intended to
incorporate and particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Title VII and Title VI, therefore, cannot be read in pari
materia." Ibid. While public employers were not added to the definition
of "employer" in Title VII until 1972, there is no evidence that this mere
addition to the definitional section of the statute was intended to transform
the substantive standard governing employer conduct. Indeed, "Congress expressly indicated the intent that the same Title VII principles be
applied to governmental and private employers alike." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 332 n. 14 (1977). The fact that a public employer
must also satisfy the Constitution does not negate the fact that the statutory prohibition with which that employer must contend was not intended
to extend as far as that of the Constitution.
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action plan, which provided that 50% of the new trainees
were to be black until the percentage of black skilled craftworkers in the employer's plant approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. Adoption of the plan
had been prompted by the fact that only 5 of 273, or 1.83%, of
skilled craftworkers at the plant were black, even though the
work force in the area was approximately 39% black. Because of the historical exclusion of blacks from craft positions,
the employer regarded its former policy of hiring trained outsiders as inadequate. to redress the imbalance in its work
force.
We upheld the employer's decision to select less senior
black applicants over the white respondent, for we found that
taking race into account was consistent with Title VII's objective of "break[ing] down old patterns of racial segregation
and hierarchy." Id., at 208. 7 We noted that the plan did
not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees," since it did not require "the discharge of white
workers and their replacement with new black hirees."
Ibid. Nor did the plan create "an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees," since half of those trained in
the new program were to be white. Ibid. Finally, we observed that the plan was a temporary measure, not designed
The dissent maintains that Weber's conclusion that Title VII does not
prohibit voluntary affirmative action programs "rewrote the statute it purported to construe." Post, a t - . Weber's decisive rejection of the argument that the "plain language" of the statute prohibits affirmative action
rested on (1) legislative history indicating Congress' clear intention that
employers play a major role in eliminating the vestiges of discrimination,
443 U. S., at 201-204, and (2) the language and legislative history of
§ 703(j) of the statute, which reflect a strong desire to preserve managerial
prerogatives so that they might be utilized for this purpose. !d. , at
204-207. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN said in his concurrence in Weber , "[I]f
the Court has misperceived the political will, it has the assurance that because the question is statutory Congress may set a different course if it so
chooses." Id ., at 216. Congress has not amended the statute to reject
our construction, nor have any such amendments even been proposed, and
we therefore may assume that our interpretation was correct.
7
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to maintain racial balance, but to "eliminate a manifest racial
imbalance." Ibid. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence
made clear, Weber held that an employer seeking to justify
the adoption of a plan need not point to its own prior discriminatory practices, nor even to evidence of an "arguable violation" on its part. !d., at 212. Rather, it need point only to a
"conspicuous ... imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories." !d., at 209. Our decision was grounded on the
recognition that voluntary employer action can play a crucial
role in furthering Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in the workplace, and that Title VII
should not be read to thwart such efforts. I d., at 204. 8
See also Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U. S. - -, - - (1986) ("We
have on numerous occasions recognized that Congress intended for voluntary compliance to be the preferred means of achieving the objectives of
Title VII"); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974) ("Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means
for achieving [Title VII's] goal"). The dissent's suggestion that an affirmative action program may be adopted only to redress an employer's past
discrimination, see post, at--, was rejected in Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U. S. 193 (1979), because the prospect of liability created by such an
admission would create a significant disincentive for voluntary action. As
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence in that case pointed out, such a standard would "plac[e] voluntary compliance with Title VII in profound jeopardy. The only way for the employer and the union to keep their footing
on the 'tightrope' it creates would be to eschew all forms of voluntary affirmative action." 443 U. S., at 210. Similarly, JusTICE O'CONNOR has
observed in the constitutional context, "[t]he imposition of a requirement
that public employers make findings that they have engaged in illegal discrimination before they engage in affirmative action programs would severely undermine public employers' incentive to meet voluntarily their civil
rights obligations." Wygant, supra, at-- (O'CONNOR, J ., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
Contrary to the dissent's contention, post, at - -, our decisions last
term in Firefighters , supra, and Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC , 478 U. S.
- - (1986), provide no support for a standard more restrictive than that
enunciated in Weber. Firefighters raised the issue of the conditions under
which parties could enter into a consent decree providing for explicit numerical quotas. By contrast, the affirmative action plan in this case sets
aside no positions for minorities or women. See infra, at 16-17. In Sheet
8
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In reviewing the employment decision at issue in this case,
we must first examine whether that decision was made p~r
suant to a plan prompted by concerns similar to those of the
employer in Weber. Next, we must determine whether the
effect of the plan on males and non-minorities is comparable
to the effect of the plan in that case.
The first issue is therefore whether consideration of the
sex of applicants for skilled craft jobs was justified by the existence of a "manifest imbalance" that reflected underrepresentation of women in "traditionally segregated job categories." ld., at 197. In determining whether an imbalance
exists that would justify taking sex or race into account, a
comparison of the percentage of minorities or women in the
employer's work force with the percentage in the area labor
market or general population is appropriate in analyzing jobs
that require no special expertise, see Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977) (comparison between percentage
of blacks in employer's work force and in general population
proper in determining extent of imbalance in truck driving
positions), or training programs designed to provide expertise, see Weber, supra (comparison between proportion of
blacks working at plant and proportion of blacks in area labor
force appropriate in calculating imbalance for purpose of
establishing preferential admission to craft training program). Where a job requires special training, however, the
comparison should be with those in the labor force who possess the relevant qualifications. See Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977) (must compare
Metal Workers , the issue we addressed was the scope of judicial remedial
authority under Title VII , authority that has not been exercised in this
case. The dissent's suggestion that employers should be able to do no
more voluntarily than courts can order as remedies, post, at - , ignores
the fundamental difference between volitional private behavior and the exercise of coercion by the state. Plainly, "Congress' concern that federal
courts not impose unwanted obligations on employers and unions ," F irefighters , supra, at - , reflects a desire to preserve a relatively large
domain for voluntary employer action.
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percentage of blacks in employer's work ranks with percentage of qualified black teachers in area labor force in determining underrepresentation in teaching positions). The requirement that the "manifest imbalance" relate to a "traditionally
segregated job category" provides assurance that sex or race
will be taken into account in a manner consistent with Title
VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of employment
discrimination.
A manifest imbalance need not be such that it would support a prima facie case against the employer, as suggested in
JUSTICE O'CONNOR's concurrence, post, since we do not regard as identical the constraints of Title VII and the federal
constitution on voluntarily adopted affirmative action plans.
Application of the "prima facie" standard in Title VII cases
would be inconsistent with Weber's focus on statistical imbalance,9 and could inappropriately create a significant disin9
The difference between the "manifest imbalance" and "prima facie"
standards is illuminated by Weber. Had the Court in that case been concerned with past discrimination by the employer, it would have focused on
discrimination in hiring skilled, not unskilled, workers , since only the scarcity of the former in Kaiser's work force would have made it vulnerable to a
Title VII suit. In order to make out a prima facie case on such a claim, a
plaintiff would be required to compare the percentage of black skilled
workers in the Kaiser work force with the percentage of black skilled craft
workers in the area labor market.
Weber obviously did not make such a comparison. Instead , it focused on
the disparity between the percentage of black skilled craft workers in Kaiser's ranks and the percentage of blacks in the area labor force. 443 U. S. ,
at 198-199. Such an approach reflected a recognition that the proportion
of black craft workers in the local labor force was likely as miniscule as the
proportion in Kaiser's work force. The Court realized that the lack of imbalance between these figures would mean that employers in precisely
those industries in which discrimination has been most effective would be
precluded from adopting training programs to increase the percentage of
qualified minorities. Thus , in cases such as Weber, where the employment
decision at issue involves the selection of unskilled persons for a training
program, the "manifest imbalance" standard permits comparison with the
general labor force. By contrast, the "prima facie" standa-rd would require comparison with the percentage of minorities or women qualified for
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centive for employers to adopt an affirmative action plan.
See Weber, supra, at 204 (Titl~ VII intended as a "catalyst"
for employer efforts to eliminate vestiges of discrimination).
A corporation concerned with maximizing return on investment, for instance, is hardly likely to adopt a plan if in order
to do so it must compile evidence that could be used to subject it to a colorable Title VII suit. 10
It is clear that the decision to hire Joyce was made pursuant to an Agency plan that directed that sex or race by taken
into account for the purpose of remedying underrepresentation. The Agency Plan acknowledged the "limited opportunities that have existed in the past," App. 57, for women to
find employment in certain job classifications "where women
have not been traditionally employed in significant numbers."
I d., at 51. 11 As a result, observed the Plan, women were
the job for which the trainees are being trained, a standard that would
have invalidated the plan in Weber itself.
10
In some cases, of course, the manifest imbalance may be sufficiently
egregious to establish a prima facie case. However, as long as there is a
manifest imbalance, an employer may adopt a plan even where the disparity is not so striking, without being required to introduce the non-statistical evidence of past discrimination that would be demanded by the "prima
facie" standard. See, e. g., Teamsters v. United States , 431 U. S. 324, 339
(1977) (statistics in pattern and practice case supplemented by testimony
regarding employment practices). Of course, when there is sufficient evidence to meet the more stringent "prima facie" standard, be it statistical,
non-statistical, or a combination of the two, the employer is free to adopt
an affirmative action plan.
11
For instance, the description of the Skilled Craft Worker category, in
which the road dispatcher position is located, is as follows:
"Occupations in which workers perform jobs which require special manual skill and a thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the process involved in the work which is acquired through on-the-job training and
experience or through apprenticeship or other formal training programs.
Includes: mechanics and repairmen; electricians, heavy equipment operators, stationary engineers, skilled machining occupations, carpenters,
compositors and typesetters and kindred workers." App. 108.
As the Court of Appeals said in its decision below, "A plethora of proof is
hardly necessary to show that women are generally underrepresented in
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concentrated in traditionally female jobs in the Agency, and
represented a lower percentage in other job classifications
than would be expected if such traditional segregation had
not occurred. Specifically, 9 of the 10 Para-Professionals
and 110 of the 145 Office and Clerical Workers were women.
By contrast, women were only 2 of the 28 Officials and
Administrators, 5 of the 58 Professionals, 12 of the 124
Technicians, none of the Skilled Craft Workers, and 1-who
was Joyce-of the 110 Road Maintenance Workers. I d., at
51-52. The Plan sought to remedy these imbalances through
"hiring, training and promotion of . . . women throughout the
Agency in all major job classifications where they are underrepresented." I d. , at 43.
As an initial matter, the Agency adopted as a benchmark
for measuring progress in eliminating underrepresentation
the long-term goal of a work force that mirrored in its major
job classifications the percentage of women in the area labor
market. 12 Even as it did so, however, the Agency acknowledged that such a figure could not by itself necessarily justify
taking into account the sex of applicants for positions in all
job categories. For positions requiring specialized training
and experience, the Plan observed that the number of minorities and women "who possess the qualifications required for
entry into such job classifications is limited." I d., at 56.
The Plan therefore directed that annual short-term goals be
formulated that would provide a more realistic indication of
the degree to which sex should be taken into account in filling
particular positions. I d., at 61-64. The Plan stressed that
such goals "should not be construed as 'quotas' that must be
met," but as reasonable aspirations in correcting the imbalsuch positions and that strong social pressures weigh against their participation." 748 F. 2d, at 1313.
12
Because of the employment decision at issue in this case, our discussion henceforth refers primarily to the Plan's provisions to remedy the underrepresentation of women. Our analysis could apply as well, however,
to the provisions of the plan pertaining to minorities.
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ance in the Agency's work force. I d., at 64. These goals
we~e to take into account factors such as "turnover, layoffs,
lateral transfers, new job openings, retirements and availability of minorities, women and handicapped persons in the
area work force who possess the desired qualifications or potential for placement." Ibid. The Plan specifically directed
that, in establishing such goals, the Agency work with the
County Planning Department and other sources in attempting to compile data on · the percentage of minorities and
women in the local labor force that were actually working in
the job classifications comprising the Agency work force.
I d., at 63-64. From the outset, therefore, the Plan sought
annually to develop even more refined measures of the underrepresentation in each job category that required
attention.
As the Agency Plan recognized, women were most egregiously underrepresented in the Skilled Craft job category,
since none of the 238 positions was occupied by a woman. In
mid-1980, when Joyce was selected for the road dispatcher
position, the Agency was still in the process of refining its
short-term goals for Skilled Craft Workers in accordance
with the directive of the Plan. This process did not reach
fruition until1982, when the Agency established a short-term
goal for that year of three women for the 55 expected openings in that job category-a modest goal of about 6% for that
category.
We reject petitioner's argument that, since only the longterm goal was in place for Skilled Craft positions at the time
of Joyce's promotion, it was inappropriate for the Director to
take into account affirmative action considerations in filling
the road dispatcher position. The Agency's Plan emphasized
that the long-term goals were not to be taken as guides for
actual hiring decisions, but that supervisors were to consider
a host of practical factors in seeking to meet affirmative action objectives, including the fact that in some job categories
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women were not qualified in numbers comparable to their
representation in the labor force.
By contrast, had the Plan simply calculated imbalances in
all categories according to the proportion of women in the
area labor pool, and then directed that hiring be governed
solely by those figures, its validity fairly could be called into
question. This is because analysis of a more specialized
labor pool normally is necessary in determining underrepresentation in some positions. If a plan failed to take distinctions in qualifications into account in providing guidance for
actual employment decisions, it would dictate mere blind hiring by the numbers , for it would hold supervisors to "achievement of a particular percentage of minority employment or
membership ... regardless of circumstances such as economic conditions or the number of qualified minority applicants . .. " Sheet Metal Workers' v. EEOC, 478 U. S. - (1986) (JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring i,n part and dissenting
in part).
The Agency's Plan emphatically did not authorize such
blind hiring. It expressly directed that numerous factors be
taken into account in making hiring decisions, including specifically the qualifications of female applicants for particular
jobs. Thus, despite the fact that no precise short-term goal
was yet in place for the Skilled Craft category in mid-1980,
the Agency's management nevertheless had been clearly instructed that they were not to hire solely by reference to
statistics. The fact that only the long-term goal had been established for this category posed no danger that personnel
decisions would be made by reflexive adherence to a numerical standard.
Furthermore, in considering the candidates for the road
dispatcher position in 1980, the Agency hardly needed to rely
on a refined short-term goal to realize that it had a significant
problem of underrepresentation that required attention.
Given the obvious imbalance in the Skilled Craft category,
and given the Agency's commitment to eliminating such im-
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balances, it was plainly not unreasonable for the Agency to
determine that it was appropriate to consider as one factor
the sex of Ms. Joyce in making its decision. 13 The promotion
of Joyce thus satisfies the first requirement enunciated in
Weber, since it was undertaken to further an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate Agency work force imbalances
in traditionally segregated job categories.
We next consider whether the Agency Plan unnecessarily
trammeled the rights of male employees or created an absolute bar to their advancement. In contrast to the plan in
Weber, which provided that 50% of the positions in the craft
training program were exclusively for blacks, and to the consent decree upheld last term in Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478
U. S. - - (1986), which required the promotion of specific
numbers of minorities, the Plan sets aside no positions for
women. The Plan expressly states that "[t]he 'goals' established for each Division should not be construed as 'quotas'
that must be met." App. 64. Rather, the Plan merely authorizes that consideration be given to affirmative action concerns when evaluating qualified applicants. As the Agency
Director testified, the sex of Joyce was but one of numerous
factors he took into acount in arriving at his decision. Tr.
68.
The Plan thus resembles the "Harvard Plan" approvingly noted by JUSTICE POWELL in University of California
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 316-319 (1978), which considers race along with other criteria in determining admission
to the college. As JusTICE POWELL observed, "In such an
admissions program, race or ethnic background may be
deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not
3

In addition, the Agency was mindful of the importance of finally hiring
a woman in a job category that had formerly been all-male. The Director
testified that, while the promotion of Joyce "made a small dent, for sure, in
the numbers, " nonetheless "philosophically it made a larger impact in that
it probably has encouraged other females and minorities to look at the possibility of so-called 'non-traditional' jobs as areas where they and the
agency both have samples of a success story." Tr. 64.
'
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insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats." I d., at 317. Similarly, the
Agency Plan requires women to compete with all other qualified applicants. No persons are automatically excluded from
consideration; all are able to have their qualifications
weighed against those of other applicants.
In addition, petitioner had no absolute entitlement to the
road dispatcher position. Seven of the applicants were classified as qualified and eligible, and the Agency Director was
authorized to promote any of the seven. Thus, denial of the
promotion unsettled no legitimate firmly rooted expectation
on the part of the petitioner. Furthermore, while the petitioner in this case was denied a promotion, he retained his
employment with the Agency, at the same salary and with
the same seniority, and remained eligible for other
•
promotions. 14
Finally, the Agency's Plan was intended to attain a balanced work ·force, not to maintain one. The Plan contains
ten references to the Agency's desire to "attain" such a balance, but no reference whatsoever to a goal of maintaining it.
The Director testified that, while the "broader goal" of affirmative action, defined as "the desire to hire, to promote, to
give opportunity and training on an equitable, non-discriminatory basis," is something that is "a permanent part" of"the
Agency's operating philosophy," that broader goal "is di"Furthermore, from 1978 to 1982 Skilled Craft jobs in the Agency increased from 238 to 349. The Agency's personnel figures indicate that the
Agency fully expected most of these positions to be filled by men. Of the
111 new Skilled Craft jobs during this period, 105, or almost 95%, went to
men. As previously noted, the Agency's 1982 Plan set a goal of hiring only
three women out of the 55 new Skilled Craft positions projected for that
year, a figure of about 6%. While this degree of employment expansion by
an employer is by no means essential to a plan's validity, it underscores the
fact that the Plan in this case in no way significantly restricts the employment prospects of such persons. Illustrative of this is the fact that an additional road dispatcher position was created in 1983, and petitioner was
awarded the job. Brief for Respondent Transportation Agency 36, n. 35.
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vorced, if you will, from specific numbers or percentages."
Tr. 48-49.
The Agency acknowledged the difficulties that it would
confront in remedying the imbalance in its work force, and
anticipated only gradual increases in the representation of
minorities and women. 15 It is thus unsurprising that the
Plan contains no explicit end date, for the Agency's flexible,
case-by-case approach was not expected to yield success in a
brief period of time. Express assurance that a program is
only temporary may be necessary if the program actually
sets aside positions according to specific numbers. See,
e. g., Firefighters, supra, at-- (four-year duration for consent decree providing for promotion of particular number of
minorities); Weber, 443 U. S., at 199 (plan requiring that
blacks constitute 50% of new trainees in effect until percentage of employer work force equal to percentage in local labor
force). This is necessary both to minimize the effect of the
program on other employees, and to ensure that the plan's
goals "[are] not being used simply to achieve and maintain
.. . balance, but rather as a benchmark against which" the
employer may measure its progress in eliminating the underrepresention of minorities and women. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at--. In this case, however, substantial evidence shows that the Agency has sought to take a moderate,
6
' As the Agency Plan stated, after noting the limited number of minorities and women qualified in certain categories, as well as other difficulties
in remedying underrepresentation:
"As indicated by the above factors, it will be much easier to attain the
Agency's employment goals in some job categories than in others. It is
particularly evident that it will be extremely difficult to significantly
increase the representation of women in technical and skilled craft job
classifications where they have traditionally been greatly underrepresented. Similarly, only gradual increases in the representation of women ,
minorities or handicapped persons in management and professional positions can realistically be expected due to the low turnover that exists in
these positions and the small numbers of persons who can be expected to
compete for available openings. " App. 58.

85-1129-0PINION
JOHNSON v. TRANSPORTATION AGENCY

21

gradual approach to eliminating the imbalance in its work
force , one which establishes realistic guidance for employment decisions, and which visits minimal intrusion on the
legitimate expectations of other employees. Given this fact,
as well as the Agency's express commitment to "attain" a balanced work force, there is ample assurance that the Agency
does not seek to use its Plan to maintain a permanent racial
and sexual balance.
III
In evaluating the compliance of an affirmative action plan
with Title VII's prohibition on discrimination, we must be
mindful of "this Court's and Congress' consistent emphasis on
'the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the
law."' Wygant, 476 U. S., at-- (JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Bakke,
supra, at 364). The Agency in the case before us has undertaken such a voluntary effort, and has done so in full recognition of both the difficulties and the potential for intrusion on
males and non-minorities. The Agency has identified a conspicuous imbalance in job categories traditionally segregated
by race and sex. It has made clear from the outset, however, that employment decisions may not be justified solely
by reference to this imbalance, but must rest on a multitude
of practical, realistic factors. It has therefore committed itself to annual adjustment of goals so as to provide a reasonable guide for actual hiring and promotion decisions. The
Agency earmarks no positions for anyone; sex is but one of
several factors that may be taken into account in evaluating
qualified applicants for a position. 16 As both the Plan's lan16
The dissent predicts that today's decision will loose a flood of "less
qualified" minorities and women upon the workforce, as employers seek to
forestall possible Title VII liability. Post, at - . The first problem
with this projection is that it is by no means certain that employers could in
every case necessarily avoid liability for discrimination merely by adopting
an affirmative action plan. Indeed, our unwillingness to require an admission of discrimination as the price of adopting a plan has been premised on
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guage and its manner of operation attest, the Agency has no
intention of establishing a work force whose permanent composition is dictated by rigid numerical standards.
We therefore hold that the Agency appropriately took into
account as one factor the sex of Diane Joyce in determining
that she should be promoted to the road dispatcher position.
The decision to do so was made pursuant to an affirmative action plan that represents a moderate, flexible, case-by-case
approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women in the Agency's work force.
Such a plan is fully consistent with Title VII, for it embodies
the contribution that voluntary employer action can make in
eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

concern that the potential liability to which such an admission would expose an employer would serve as a disincentive for creating an affirmative
action program. See supra, n. 6.
A second , and more fundamental, problem with the dissent's speculation
is that it ignores the fact that
"[i]t is a standard tenet of personnel administration that there is rarely a
single, 'best qualified' person for a job. An effective personnel system will
bring before the selecting official several fully-qualified candidates who
each may possess different attributes which recommend them for selection.
Especially where the job is an unexceptional, middle-level craft position,
without the need for unique work experience or educational attainment and
for which several well-qualified candidates are available, final determinations as to which candidate is 'best qualified' are at best subjective." Brief
for American Society for Personnel Administration as Amicus Curiae 9.
This case provides an example of precisely this point. Any differences
in qualifications between Johnson and Joyce were minimal, to say the least.
See supra, at 5-7. The selection of Joyce thus belies the dissent's contention that the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs will be those employees who are merely not "utterly unqualified." Post , at--.
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